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Abstract
Mobile applications are increasingly popular, and help mobile users in many aspects
of their lifestyle. Applications have access to a wealth of information about the user
through powerful developer APIs. It is known that most applications, even popular
and highly regarded ones, utilize and leak privacy data to the network. It is also
common for applications to over-access privacy data that does not fit the function-
ality profile of the application. Although there are available privacy detection tools,
they might not provide sufficient context to help users better understand the privacy
behaviours of their applications.
In this dissertation, I present the design, implementation and evaluation of an
Automated Privacy Testing System called MAMBA for uncovering the causes of
user-triggered leaks in Android applications (’leak causes’) as well as their paths
taken to reach the leaks. Privacy ’leak-causes’ refer to privacy usage and leak char-
acteristics of applications as well as user-actions and activities with privacy impli-
cations. Paths refers to page transition paths as well as the sequence of user actions
required to cause these transitions. This solution is based on hybrid application
of dynamic/static analysis of Android applications, and it involves improving au-
tomated testing of applications for run-time verification of the ’leak causes’. The
automated testing is based on directed testing, and automatically traverses appli-
cations from initial to resulting activities with potential leak behaviours, based on
paths obtained from static analysis of the Android callback control flows.
I demonstrate the advantages of my automated testing system through stand-
alone evaluations as well as comparisons with another automated testing system -
Automated Model Checker (AMC) [39]. The results show that MAMBA has large
improvements in terms of less testing time required, with only a small reduction in
coverage. MAMBA also has good privacy data access accuracy (Precision=79.84%
, Recall=68.90%), and moderate privacy data leak accuracy (Precision=35.66% ,
Recall=56.10%) - (Recall values were measured relative to AMC). Privacy detec-
tors of ProtectMyPrivacy (PMP) and TaintDroid were utilized for runtime measure-
ments.
I also show how the resulting outputs of privacy ’leak causes’ can be utilized
together with a privacy message overlay mechanism for warning users of privacy
triggers interactively during application uses. I have conducted field and lab user
studies to show that the privacy messages can aid users to utilize applications in a
way that uses less of their privacy data, if they do not agree with the privacy usages.
I also found that there are other factors which influence message effectiveness.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mobile applications (apps) are ubiquitous in the modern age of smart devices, and
have become an indispensable part of life. They help to manage many aspects
of urban lifestyle, e.g. from looking for locations of nearby restaurants and re-
tails venues, to helping users’ keep track of their expenditure and health. A robust
ecosystem exists in the mobile application stores, such as in Google Playstore and
Apple iTunes Store, where millions of apps are downloaded everyday.
It is important for good methods to be available for notifying and educating
the user on apps that may inappropriately infringe on their privacy. There is an
increasingly urgent need to be able to detect and profile privacy usage characteristics
of mobile apps. While a great asset to users, mobile apps have access to a wealth of
information about the user through powerful Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs) provided by the operation system platforms. Many apps might not follow
good practices in privacy design [45]. It is well known that many apps, even popular
and highly regarded ones, access and leak privacy data to the network.
To aid in resolving these problems, various privacy detection tools have been
created by the research community [24, 61, 3] as well as platform developers [6, 56]
for detection and control of applications’ uses of privacy data. There has also been
various work in designing usable interfaces that make it easier for users to configure
privacy decisions [5, 12].
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Privacy leak detection tools [24, 6] are geared towards the monitoring of pri-
vacy infringements rather than on effective notifications to the user. The tools in-
form users whenever privacy infringements take place during run-time, but do not
provide sufficient context or summarized insights on these infringements or app be-
haviours. Various works have sought to address this by improving mechanism for
privacy notification [12], using and improving visual framing (e.g. icons next to
text, ratings etc.) [2], as well as by the improvement of textual outlook [16], linguis-
tic properties [32] and timing [60] of privacy messages. An aspect that is missing
from current work is on providing users with additional context or insights into the
privacy characteristic of apps. Doing this can potentially improve the value of pri-
vacy notifications and aid users in improving their privacy. It also might allow them
to set better privacy policies in privacy data managers [6] available in current mobile
OSes.
Hence, privacy detection tools might not provide sufficient context information
on app behaviours (e.g. they do not show which app views actually utilize data, or
whether privacy leaks are caused by user actions or system events etc.), and they also
present notices in a manner that might not be easily digestible by users. Providing
these additional privacy contexts in the form of tailored privacy notices could aid
users to better understand their apps privacy usage and improve their privacy.
In addition, a characteristic of these tools is that the detection of privacy leak-
s/accesses are performed in real-time during uses by the mobile user [24, 61, 14, 3,
61, 33]. Test inputs have to be generated for traversal of app states before the pri-
vacy detectors can effectively detect privacy behaviours. This relies on the mobile
user, who usually has to run through applications before notifications (e.g. Scroll-
downs, Pop-ups or from within a Permission Management List etc.) appear from
the privacy detector running in the background, warning the user of privacy leak or
access caused by the application.
Besides real-time systems, static leak detection systems such as FlowDroid [9]
and PiOS [23] are able to analyze privacy infringements in mobile apps as well.
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However, these systems also do not provide sufficient context information on app
behaviours, and are also not geared towards the presentation of notifications to users
in an easily digestible and understandable manner.
The objectives of my work are thus to be able to accurately, efficiently and scal-
ably output the causes of user-triggered privacy leaks and privacy characteristics of
mobile apps, after which, to provide effective notifications to users by superimposi-
tion of privacy notices on top of culprit app buttons/views to improve users privacy
behaviours and understanding of their apps privacy characteristics, and to evaluate
the notification mechanism alongside existing mechanisms of other privacy notifi-
cation systems.
In this dissertation, I present a novel hybrid static and dynamic analysis solu-
tion and system for automatically uncovering and testing the causes and paths of
user-triggered privacy leaks (’leak causes’) in Android applications (MAMBA Sys-
tem). Paths refers to page transition paths as well as the sequence of user actions
required to cause these transitions. These privacy ’leak causes’ serve to function as
an additional context to help users better understand their apps’ privacy behaviours.
My approach first utilizes static analysis to obtain causes of user-triggered pri-
vacy data accesses in applications as well as the view transitional paths that users
would take towards these activities. A dynamic testing stage is then performed for
runtime verification of the privacy accesses. The dynamic testing stage helps to im-
prove on the outputs of static analysis, by verifying that the privacy accesses and
leaks occur during app runtime.
App binaries are first analyzed statically to identify the Android activities that
are linked to privacy sensitive APIs in the control flow. The paths towards these
activities, from the initial activities, are then obtained by the analysis of control
flow between call-back functions of the app, so that an activity-transition graph
can be obtained. This activity-transition graph is then used to direct the transition
of the app towards the privacy-related activities at run time. The testing process
produces test logs which can be analyzed to uncover specific user-actionable app
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components on activities that cause privacy leaks. This information can be stored
in a ’leak-cause’ database for customizable notifications to users by a lightweight
mobile app. The mobile app overlays privacy messages on top of culprit buttons
and views during app usage.
I evaluate my MAMBA system against a prominent automated app testing so-
lution - Automated Model Checking (AMC) [39] for over 500 apps. My evaluation
criteria is based on the average testing time required (latency), coverage of activities
that are required to be reached as well as the precision of uncovering privacy-related
behaviours in these activities.
I also investigate the effects of providing the analysis outputs to real users in lab
and field studies involving users on their personal devices over a period of weeks. I
demonstrate the effectiveness of the outputs in changing user behaviors by showing
reduced frequency of app accesses and duration of app uses for users who disagree
with the app privacy behaviours. In the next sections, I detail my thesis statement,
approach and contributions.
1.1 Thesis Statement
My thesis statement is as follows:
Providing the additional context on the causes and characteristics of user-
triggered privacy leaks in mobile apps can help users to change behaviours
that impact their privacy. These causes and characteristics can be efficiently
and accurately uncovered by a hybrid application of static analysis of callback
functions and runtime traversal of the apps towards targeted pages with privacy
implications. This method also has advantages over the other automated app
testing approaches in terms of significantly less testing time.
As stated above, the main objectives in my dissertation are to output causes and
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characteristics of user-triggered app privacy leaks accurately and efficiently from
hybrid static and dynamic analysis of apps. The processing of apps should be done
in a scalable and accurate manner, and with high coverage so that specific areas of
the apps can be reached in practical amount of testing time. I evaluate and compared
my automated testing system and approach against another prominent automated
testing solution, Automated Model Checking (AMC). The outputs from the system
can then be utilized to notify users about privacy issues.
I also aim to present these outputs in a manner that will help mobile users to
improve their privacy. The improvement in their privacy will be measured in terms
of decrease in their app-usage metrics (usage frequency, duration and no. of buttons
clicked) for apps with privacy behaviours that they are in disagreement with.
1.2 Approach
My approach is based on the following areas, (i) A Novel Hybrid Static/Dynamic
Analysis System, (ii) Evaluation of the System and (iii) User Studies to Investigate
Utility of the System Outputs:
(i) Novel Hybrid Static/Dynamic Analysis System: Static analysis is used to cap-
ture activity/page transition paths of Android apps, as well as identify target activi-
ties that leak privacy data. Obtaining such transition paths require the construction
of the control flows among Android call-back functions. Android call-backs are
event-driven function calls within the Android framework that may be enacted by
the user (via event listeners) or centrally called by the system during the Android
life-cycle or occurrence of system-related events.
Due to the event-driven nature of the Android framework, the control flow
among call-back functions are not available from a standard control-flow graph. To
overcome this problem, I have formulated and implemented algorithms that build
the control flows among call-back methods of Android activities and the unique GUI
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components linked to these call-back methods, from Android bytecode representa-
tions. The sequence of user actions from the control flows can then be used to build
test cases for an automated tester to direct the executions of the apps towards privacy
related activities, so that causes of privacy leaks can be tested at run-time. This is
different from prior work, in that user-triggered activity transition paths leading to-
wards privacy related app activities and GUI components are produced as additional
context, in addition to privacy leak points.
The automated app testing part of my solution aims to test and verify privacy
leaks. While a number of automated testing solutions exist [18, 43, 42, 39, 51],
automated app testing remains a time and resource intensive process. My automated
directed app traversal technique aims to reduce the testing time required for each
app, while maintaining coverage and accuracy in uncovering user-triggered leaks.
(ii) Evaluation of the System: I conduct evaluations to compare my system with
another automated testing system, Automated Model Checker (AMC) on a sizeable
set of over 500 apps crawled from popular categories from the Google PlayStore.
The metrics for evaluation are average app testing times required (latency),
coverage of target activities and accuracy of uncovering privacy accesses and leaks.
I investigate average performance as well as look at the performance distributions
across the apps. I determine what advantages, trade-offs and other performance
concerns my proposed system have against the other app testing system.
(iii) User Studies to Investigate Utility of the System Outputs: I aim to provide
deeper context and insights into the characteristic of apps in privacy notices by dis-
playing the causes and characteristics of user-triggered leaks in privacy notices for
apps. These notices are overlaid on top of privacy invasive app buttons and views,
on reaching certain in-app activities, as well as on starting up the app. To the best
of my knowledge, the display of causes of user-triggered privacy leaks to users has
not been studied before.
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I investigate how real users in the field react in response to these notices, as well
as how their mobile behaviours can be changed from knowledge obtained from the
notices. In addition, I investigate and demonstrate improvements in users’ recol-
lection and understanding of apps’ uses of their privacy when they are presented
with notices from my mechanism. I perform such measurements by studying users’
privacy-related inclinations after using applications with and without the notices.
1.3 Research Contributions
My research contributions are as follows:
• Design and implement a novel hybrid static/dynamic tool for outputting
causes and paths of user-triggered privacy leaks in Android apps
• Formulate algorithms for analyzing the control flows among call-back func-
tions that are involved in activity and page transitions in Android apps, to
create an activity-transition graph
• Utilize the activity-transition graph to direct traversal of applications towards
privacy-related activities for automated testing and verification at run time
• Evaluate the automated testing solution on a sizeable number of over 500
Android apps to demonstrate its scalability and performance; Also perform a
comparison of the automated testing solution and algorithm against another
testing system to demonstrate its advantages/trade-offs in terms of improved
testing time, and relatively acceptable coverage and accuracy in privacy de-
tection.
• Investigate the effectiveness of providing additional context of causes of pri-
vacy leaks to mobile users under real-world conditions.
• Demonstrate that users privacy behaviours are improved when notified on the
causes of privacy leaks as well as app privacy characteristics, and investi-
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gate users inclinations when presented with the privacy notices, as well as
the factors affecting users’ privacy decisions (e.g. Prior app usage history,
Agreement with privacy of app, Type of app etc.).
1.4 Summary of Thesis Results
A summary of my key thesis results is as follows:
Empirical Study on Taxonomy of User-Triggered Privacy Leaks
Based on an empirical study of 226 Androids apps from popular categories of the
Google PlayStore:
• 46.5% (105) of apps were found to leak privacy data.
• Apps were found to possess a taxonomy of privacy leak behaviours of (i)
User-Triggered Leaks, (ii) Start-up Leaks and (iii) Periodic Leaks.
• More than half of the apps with privacy leaks (64 apps) was found to leak due
to user triggers on app widgets/buttons.
• Using Association Rules Mining, an overall knowledge database on the app
views/buttons that cause user-trigger leaks can be built. Information from this
knowledge database can be utilized by an Interactive Privacy Leak Reporter,
for the display of privacy notices to users during app usage.
Evaluation of MAMBA Privacy System
Based on a comparison of MAMBA Privacy System with the Automated Model
Checker (AMC) on a set of 500 apps:
• MAMBA has an advantage over AMC in terms of less testing time required
overall (13.18 mins/app for MAMBA compared to 51.86 mins/app for AMC),
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with only a small reduction in activity coverage (63.96% for MAMBA com-
pared to 70.33% for AMC).
• MAMBA has good privacy data access accuracy (Precision=79.84%, Re-
call=68.90%) and moderate privacy data leak accuracy (Precision=35.66%,
Recall=56.10%) - (Recall values were measured relative to AMC)
• Overall, MAMBA was almost 4 times faster than AMC (13.18 mins/app com-
pared to 51.86 mins/app) in detecting and verifying privacy-related activities.
For apps with privacy behaviours, MAMBA was 2.7 times faster than AMC
(21.52 mins/app compared to 57.11 mins/app). And for apps with no privacy
behaviours, MAMBA had the largest advantage in being almost 8 times faster
than AMC (6.08 mins/app comapred to 47.4 mins/app).
User Studies on Utility of System Outputs
The following results were found from lab and field studies, using outputs of user-
triggered causes of privacy leaks:
• For the lab study, it was found that there was a 0% to 80% drop in users
avoiding privacy leak causing widgets/buttons for the 4 test apps. Usability
was maintained for apps with and without privacy messages, based on Likert
Scores.
• For the field study conducted with 42 users over a 2 week period, users who
received privacy messages, disapproved of the app’s data use as well as had
(i) User education stimulus, (ii) High levels of privacy consciousness and (iii)
High levels of surprise at message contents, were shown to have reduced du-
ration of app usage, reduced frequency of app start ups as well as a reduction
in the number of leak-causing buttons clicked upon.
• Users’ Prior App Usage Time (Familiarity) had the highest statistical strength
in influencing app usage behaviours. This implied that users who have been
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utilizing the apps for a longer period of time were less likely to decrease
utilization of apps, in spite of receiving privacy messages.
Resulting Publications
The following publications resulted from this work:
1. J. C. J. Keng, T. K. Wee, L. Jiang, and R. K. Balan. ”The case for mobile
forensics of private data leaks: towards large-scale user-oriented privacy
protection.” In Proceedings of the 4th Asia-Pacific Workshop on Systems
(APSys 2013), page 6. ACM, 2013.
2. J. C. J. Keng, L. Jiang, T. K. Wee, and R. K. Balan. ”Graph-aided di-
rected testing of android applications for checking runtime privacy be-
haviours.” In 11th IEEE/ACM International Workshop on Automation of
Software Test (AST 2016), (Co-located with ICSE 2016), 2016.
3. J. C. J. Keng, L. Jiang, T. K. Wee, and R. K. Balan. ”Leveraging Auto-
mated Privacy Checking For Design of Mobile Privacy Protection Mech-
anisms.” In 1st Workshop on Bridging the Gap Between Privacy By Design
and Privacy in Practice, (Co-located with CHI 2016), 2016.
1.5 Existing Work (Literature Review)
In this section, I highlight some existing work on the analysis of mobile app pri-
vacy and make some comparisons in relation to my work. I focus on 3 aspects of
mobile app privacy related work: (i) Mobile Privacy Detection & Protection Sys-
tems, (ii) Automated Testing Systems and (iii) Privacy Notification Mechanisms.
The comparisons serve to bucket the different dimensions such as techniques uti-
lized, characteristics, capabilities, usable outputs and performance measures of the
various systems.
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1.5.1 Mobile Privacy Detection & Protection Systems
(Please refer to Appendix A (Table A.1): Comparison Table of Mobile Privacy
& Detection Systems) A detailed comparison list of some privacy systems devel-
oped in recent years by the research community is displayed [65, 50, 26, 41, 25, 9,
7, 40, 59, 23, 52]. The dimensions for comparisons are: ’Privacy-Related Behaviour
Analyzed’, ’Usable Outputs’, ’Techniques’, ’Latency’, ’Coverage’ and ’Accuracy’.
From the table, the Privacy-Related Behaviours analyzed by these systems in-
clude malicious behaviours of apps, privacy leaks, app network and data transmis-
sion characteristics, privacy-risk levels, sensitive user inputs and personally identi-
fiable information.
Usable Outputs provided by these systems range from flagging of apps which
display malicious behaviours, providing privacy analysis reports/risk assessment,
identification of program source/sinks of privacy leaks, additional contextual in-
formation for enabling better privacy understanding, as well as leak detection of
sensitive data fields.
Techniques utilized by these systems are mainly static/dynamic analysis, as well
as machine-learning and network flow detection.
Latency refers to the average length of time to process each app, and ranged
from just a few minutes per app to more than 1 day per app. Coverage refers to the
extent by which the apps are covered. While Accuracy is the level of correctness of
the systems’ outputs.
Comparison with my Approach & System: The goals of my system are to un-
cover the causes and paths leading to user-triggered privacy leaks in mobiles apps,
to act as additional form of contextual information to aid users in protecting their
privacy. It does so by analyzing the control flows among callback functions that
are involved in activity and page transitions in Android apps, to create an activity
transition graph. This representation can then be utilized to improve app coverage
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and testing time during automated testing. It does so by directing executions of the
app from root (main) to targeted activities within the app for testing and verification
of privacy leaks. The knowledge obtained from the process can then be utilized as
a form of additional contextual information to improve user privacy, as well as to
allow them to set better privacy policies for controlling their privacy data.
For the dimension of ’Privacy-Related Behaviour Analyzed’ in the comparisons,
my system falls under detection of privacy leaks. The ’Usable Outputs’ are provid-
ing additional contextual informational for enabling better privacy understanding.
While the techniques utilized are static/dynmaic analysis.
1.5.2 Automated Testing Systems
(Please refer to Appendix A (Table A.2): Comparison Table of Automated Test-
ing Systems) An integral part of my privacy analysis solution consists of automated
app testing to achieve good runtime coverage of mobile apps, for verification of
the outputs of static analysis for improved accuracy. In this section, I provide a
comparison of currently available automated testing solutions and systems.
From Appendix B, the dimensions for comparison are: ’Exploration Strategy’,
’Exploration Target’, ’Exploration Technique’, ’Inputs Simulated’ and ’Purpose’.
There are 4 main types of Exploration Strategies, (i) Random, (ii) Systematic Event
Selection, (iii) Model-Based (Built On-the-Fly at Runtime) and (iv) Model-Based
(from Static Analysis).
(i) Random exploration is based on the generation and simulation of random
user inputs in order to enact app state and activity/page changes. For example, the
simplest and most frequently used Monkey [18] generates random UI events for
black-box testing. (ii) Systematic Event Selection is still based on random explo-
ration, but have more systhematic selection methods of simulated user inputs. For
example, Dynodroid [43] has a series of exploration strategies, Frequency, Uni-
formRandom and BiasedRandom that helps to improve coverage. (iii) Model-based
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(On-the-Fly at Runtime) exploration strategy builds a model of the runtime app
states and user events encountered during exploration, and utilizes the model to tra-
verse the app and keep track of states already explored. AMC [39] and DECAF [42]
extracts the DOM trees from the apps at runtime to build UI models, and performs
its exploration of the models.
The automated testing strategy employed in my hybrid static/analysis privacy
analysis system falls under the category of (iv) Model-Based (from Static Analy-
sis), where a model for exploration is built prior to runtime. A3E [10] has a targeted
exploration strategy based on following a Static Activity Transition Graph. While
this approach is similar to my system, it is based on a simplified intent analysis of
sources and sinks in activity startups, and does not analyze event handlers of GUI
objects or their identifiers. A closer inspection at its targeted exploration algorithm
reveals that it still requires extraction and iteration over the runtime GUI elements
obtained from the Android Hierarchyviewer. ORBIT [64] utilizes static analysis
for detection of event handlers of the apps, but does not analyze activity transition
paths. The exploration model is still built from dynamic analysis. Further more,
the source code of the app is required for exploration. Brahmastra [15] utilizes a
similar concept to my system, in that it uses static analysis to map transition paths
of Android activities for exploration. However, these transition paths do not model
GUI widgets, app layout views or listener objects. Instead, Brahmastra relies on
re-writing of apps to force activity transitions (’self-execution’). This has disadvan-
tages as the paths might not be entirely representative of those triggered by a real
user. The path transitions employed in my solution involves transition paths that are
reachable by real users, with no artificial forcing of app activity and state transitions.
’Exploration Target’ refers to the prioritization by the tester to cover specific
parts of the app. For example, whether the app will try to cover all pages within the
app indiscriminately, or only cover some distinct pages. ’Inputs Simulated’ refers
to the types of inputs that the tester uses (UI Events and/or System Inputs). While
’Purpose’ refers to the reason that each system was built for. For example, for Stress
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Testing or General Testing etc.
For ’Exploration Target’, my MAMBA system prioritizes app pages with pri-
vacy implications. The ’Inputs Simulated’ are UI Events and the ’Purpose’ is for
privacy analysis.
1.5.3 Privacy Notification Mechanisms
(Please refer to Appendix A (Table A.3): Comparisons Table of Privacy No-
tification Systems) One of my main thesis components involve the usage of the
outputs of my privacy analysis system to improve user privacy. As detailed in Sec-
tion 2.3, my privacy notifications mechanism involves highlighting the causes/paths
of privacy leaks as well as privacy leakage characteristics of mobile apps. It does
so by privacy message overlays on top of leak-cause buttons/widgets, as well as
the display of messages whenever the user navigates to associated app views and
activities.
In this section, I perform a comparison of the various privacy notification sys-
tems and their notification mechanisms employed in these systems [61, 44, 65, 6,
48, 29, 38, 14, 5, 55, 52, 24]. As displayed in the table of Appendix C, these system
are compared in the dimensions of ’Notification Content’, ’Notification Interface’,
’Frequency’, ’Action’, ’Timing’ as well as ’Granularity’.
From Appendix C, the Notification Contents range from real-time privacy data
accesses, additional install time permissions control & options, summarized privacy
access-control lists of all apps installed, statistics of data usage (Frequency of ac-
cesses, Categories of apps etc.) as well as additional context of app privacy usages
(e.g. Network IP, Screen-capture sequences). The ’Notification Interfaces’ utilized
are Dialog Boxes, Install-time lists, background Android messages, standard An-
droid Scroll-down Notifications, as well as summarized Privacy Manager Lists.
In terms of ’Notification Contents’, my notification mechanism can best be cate-
gorized under providing users with Additional Context of app Privacy Usages, while
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’Notification Interfaces’ employed are Android Toast Messages.
’Frequency’ refers to how often the privacy notifications appear, and can be at
every privacy instance or configurable etc. ’Action’ refers to the notifications be-
ing either ’Blocking’ or ’Non-Blocking’. ’Blocking’ notifications are accompanied
by a screen freeze, with choices required to be made by users before app usage
can continue. While ’Non-Blocking’ notifications do not have any screen freezes.
’Timing’ refers to the time period where notifications appear (Before or after pri-
vacy event). And ’Granularity’ refers to the detail level of information contained by
the notifications.
For ’Frequency’, my MAMBA system notifies the user at every privacy ac-
cess/leak instance. For ’Action’, my privacy messages are of the ’Non-Blocking’
type. The ’Timing’ of notifications are before each privacy event. And the ’Granu-
larity’ of MAMBA is at the Data level.
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Chapter 2
Uncovering Causes and Paths of
User-Triggered Privacy Leaks
In this chapter, I present my framework for privacy analysis of mobile apps at the
back-end and utilization of the results to build a knowledge base to help improve
user privacy. I detail some preliminary findings on the feasibility of uncovering user-
triggered privacy leaks, as well as present an empirical study on the taxonomies of
privacy behaviours of Playstore apps.
I describe my hybrid static/dynamic analysis solution and system (MAMBA
System) for analysis and uncovering of the causes of user-triggered privacy leaks in
Android apps. The system identifies Android activities that have privacy related API
calls (Target Activities) and outputs their activity transition paths by static analysis.
These paths are then provided to a directed automated runtime tester to transit the
app towards these Target Activities, where they are verified by privacy access/leak
detectors.
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Figure 2.1: Diagram of Privacy Analysis Solution Framework Consisting of Subsys-
tems: (i)Large-Scale App Testing (LSAT) Engine, (ii) Leak-Cause Analysis (LCA)
and (iii)Privacy Guidance Mechanism (PGM).
2.1 Privacy Analysis Solution Framework
2.1.1 Components of Framework
The framework of my privacy analysis solution is as shown in Figure 2.1. It is based
on automated analysis of mobile app binaries on back-end machines, prior to instal-
lation and release by the app store. Useful privacy-related behaviour information
can then be mined and passed on to mobile users for them to make more informed
and educated choices, and improve their privacy protection. The framework con-
sists of 3 main sub-systems: the (i) Large-Scale App Testing (LSAT) Engine, (ii)
Leak-Cause Analysis (LCA) and (iii) Privacy Guidance Mechanism (PGM).
(i) Large-Scale App Testing (LSAT) Engine: This sub-system is for mass dy-
namic/static analysis for the purpose of uncovering runtime privacy behaviours for a
large number of apps. It consists of the Automated Tester, Static Analyzer, Privacy
Detectors and the Coordinator & Event Logger components. The Automated Tester
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performs automated exploration of the app, with the aim of covering all possible UI
windows that users would reach. The Static Analyzer performs static analysis on
decompiled mobile app binaries, for the purposes of utilizing knowledge obtained
from static analysis to aid in automated testing. This is so that testing times required
can be reduced, by pruning the search space required for testing. In addition, static
analysis allows the uncovering of a subset of activities that are suspected to leak
or access user privacy data. Such information might be useful to users for privacy
protection.
The Privacy Detectors component of LSAT detects if any privacy data on the
test device is being leaked to the network, and outputs timestamped leak reports to
test logs for offline analysis. I utilized the TaintDroid [24] and ProtectMyPrivacy
(PMP) [48] privacy detectors to generate leak reports for privacy leaks and accesses
respectively in this work.
The last component, the Coordinator & Event Logger, performs 2 roles in the
system. The 1st is to coordinate testing activities on parallelized testers, and the 2nd
is to capture and log all useful usage traces from automated testing for subsequent
analysis. The usage traces include information on UI activities reached, window
views, widgets clicked upon and app screen-captures. Such usage traces were
obtained by instrumenting and extending the Android Framework and customizing
the operating system (OS) image [20]. These traces allow the deduction and
reconstruction of app states that occurred during automated testing. These traces
are analyzed in the Leak-Cause Analysis described next.
(ii) Leak-Cause Analysis (LCA) Subsystem: The Leak-cause analysis subsys-
tem’s purpose is to mine test logs for useful privacy characteristics of mobile apps
tested by the Large-Scale App Testing (LSAT) Engine, in particular privacy leak-
causes of apps. It does so by the process of Frequent Item-set mining, to output
leakage patterns of tested apps with sufficiently high support values. These leakage
patterns include the sequences of user-events that cause privacy leaks, as well as
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the privacy leakage characteristics (whether privacy leaks are user-triggered, and/or
occur at start-up or in a periodic fashion).
In addition to leak patterns, the LCA also performs superimposition of app
screen captures with button/widget overlay boxes. This functions as a visual aid
in user education. The validation process of LCA is fully automated, and records
leak patterns and behaviours into a ’Leak-Cause Database’ for a knowledge-base
reference to users.
(iii) Privacy Guidance Mechanism (PGM) Subsystem: The Privacy Guidance
Mechanism (PGM) Subsystem serves to utilize the ’Leak-Cause Database’ gener-
ated by the LCA to provide interactive notifications to the user. The notifications
can be utilized in a variety of ways with good flexibility: For example in a pri-
vacy manager containing a summarized list for users to refer to privacy behaviours
of apps. Or in the form of privacy messages which appear to the user during app
operation.
Information from the ’Leak-cause Database’ can be transmitted locally from the
user device itself or by HTTP from a cloud-based reporter. Privacy notifications
is performed by a notifications PGM client, which is a customized light-weight
Android app that runs in the background as an Android service and detects the app
usage state of the user, performing notifications at the required moments.
2.2 Hybrid Static/Dynamic Analysis Solution
(MAMBA System)
The overall system diagram for my proposed Hybrid Static/Dynamic Analysis sys-
tem is displayed in Figure 2.2 - MAMBA System [35]. This can be considered the
design and solution for the ’Large-Scale App Testing (LSAT) Engine’ of my Privacy
Analysis Framework of Section 2.1.1.
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Figure 2.2: System Diagram of Proposed Hybrid Static/Dynamic Analysis System
for Uncovering User-Triggered Causes and Paths of Privacy Leaks in Android Apps
(MAMBA System)
From Figure 2.2, an Android .apk is decompiled into its the Jimple [58] byte-
code representation. An analysis is first performed to uncover the targeted Android
activities that should be reached. This is done by backwards callgraph traversal
from the invocation points of Sensitive Data API calls in the bytecode.
A data/control-flow analysis is then performed on Callback functions to output
an Activity Transition Graph (ATG). The ATG contains path transition information
that allows the activity transitions from starting to any Android activity within the
app. Information on the user events required (clickable buttons/widgets) to enable
these transitions are also contained in the ATG. Knowledge on target activities is
then used to filter the ATG paths, so that test cases can be built for a runtime tester to
transit the app from root to any of the target activities, where the privacy access/leak
behaviours are verified at runtime.
I describe the components of my solution in the following sub-sections:
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2.2.1 Association of App Activities/Views with Privacy Sensitive
APIs
The solution starts with identifying Android App Activities/Views that are associa-
tion with privacy-related API calls. (The algorithm for association of app activities
with privacy sensitive APIs is in Algorithm 1 of Appendix A.) From Figure 2.2,
the binary .apk file of the Android app is first decompiled using SOOT’s Android
Dalvik bytecode conversion to the Jimple Representation [13]. All privacy sensitive
data API invocation points which obtain some form of user data (e.g. GPS location,
Contact List, Phone No., Identifiers etc.) are located. These APIs were sourced
from the Android API documentation [46]. (Please refer to Appendix A for the list
of APIs) My system performs a back-ward callgraph traversal from these invoca-
tion points, and identifies the app activities which have methods along the callgraph.
Such activities are then designated as Target Activities that my Automated Runtime
App Testing Solution should reach.
From Algorithm 1, 2 types of target activities are outputted: ’Target Activities
to Reach’ τ1, as well as ’Target Activities to Test’ τ2. For τ1 activities, it is suf-
ficient to perform runtime testing only to the point of reaching the activity, before
the privacy accesses/leaks occur. This is because the privacy sensitive APIs exist
under methods which are part of the Android creation lifecycle. For τ2 activities,
privacy sensitive APIs exist under ’User-Input’ handling methods (e.g. onClick). It
is thus required for runtime testing to reach as well as perform testing (by enacting
clickable buttons/widgets) on the activities.
Android activities that have privacy sensitive API invocation points that are nei-
ther under Android creation lifecycle or ’User-Input’ handling methods are desig-
nated under the τ2 activity group.
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2.2.2 Analysis of Control-Flow Between Android Callbacks
The next step in my solution involves analysis of the control flow between Callback
Functions of the Android Framework to build an Activity Transition Graph (ATG)
representation for guiding automated runtime testing. Android Callback Functions
are event-driven. They can be driven by the user (e.g. by the user performing an ac-
tion), or coordinated and driven by the system (e.g. on Activity creation/destruction,
on closing of windows etc.). Because of this event-driven nature, the control-flow
between Callback functions will not be available from a normal control-flow graph
analysis.
To solve the problem, Yang et al. [63] performed modelling of Android call-
back functions, and made their work available as a tool- GATOR tool [53]. Initial
versions of my system were built on top of the GATOR tool and its modelling of
Android Callback functions and GUI objects. However, it was discovered that the
GATOR tool suffers from generalizability issues whereby the number of apps which
could be successfully analyzed was low. On performing a larger-scale evaluation,
only about 80 of 600 (13.3%) Android apps could be successfully analyzed. I hence
implemented my own analysis of callback functions.
A possible reason for GATOR’s generalizability problems is that it tries to do
very detailed modelling of control flows (e.g. The exact sequences of control flows,
as well as the types and characteristics of the views being inflated). Hence it might
not have been able to handle the complexities with different app implementations.
My analysis outputs Fully-Directed as well as Semi-Directed Activity Transi-
tional Graphs (ATG) and test cases for automated testing. These are described as
follows:
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Fully-Directed Activity Transitional Graph (ATG)
In the Fully-Directed ATG, exact widget identifier information is contained in the
activity transitional edges. The automated runtime testing thus only requires stimu-
lating a single user-input to cause an activity transitions in each ATG edge. I formu-
lated and implemented an algorithm for callback function analysis over SOOT to
generate these ATG edges. The algorithm is based on the analysis of Android User-
Input Listener Invocation Points and the dataflow tracking of listener objects across
Android callback functions to identify the corresponding GUI element involved, as
well as source and target activities. (Please refer to Algorithm 2 in Appendix A)
Figure 2.3 illustrates examples of resulting Fully Directed test cases for ex-
ample activities of 2 apps: 2 different paths were found for ’.PremiumActivity’,
the 1st shorter path being a single user-action on the widget with identifier ’ac-
tion premium’, and the 2nd longer path involving transition with 2 user-actions
(’action info’ and ’premiumUpgradeButton’). The other example for the activity
’.koisettings’ found 4 different possible paths from root to the activity, the 1st path
requiring 2 user-actions, and 2nd-4th paths requiring 3 user-actions.
Target Activity: com.bitsmedia.android.quitpro.activities.PremiumActivity
(App: com.bitsmedia.android.quitpro.apk)
Test Case #1 : [action premium]
Test Case #2 : [action info, premiumUpgradeButton]
Target Activity: com.interestingcoolerfreegoimbh.app.koisettings
(App: com.interestingcoolerfreegoimbh.apk)
Test Case #1 : [settings, button1unlock]
Test Case #2 : [settings, RelativeLayout04, gridview]
Test Case #3 : [settings, RelativeLayout05, gridview2]
Test Case #4 : [settings, RelativeLayout03, gridviewback]
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Figure 2.3: Example: Format of Fully-Directed Test Cases Built from Callback
Function Analysis For Automated Testing
To increase accessibility and improve testing time, multiple paths for each ac-
tivity were ordered according to length of shortest to longest, and executed shortest
paths first before trying out longer paths if the shorter paths were found to be in-
feasible. The automated tester executes shorter paths before moving to try out the
longer paths if it is unable to reach the resulting activity.
While a Fully-Directed ATG is highly efficient in guiding automated runtime
testing, the generalizability of the analysis is still imperfect in uncovering paths
for all apps. For apps in which fully-directed ATG cannot be obtained, the Semi-
Directed ATG is utilized to generate test cases. This is described in the following
sub-section.
Semi-Directed Activity Transitional Graph (ATG)
In the Semi-Directed ATG, the Android callback function analysis does not directly
output exact button/widget identifier information. Semi-Directed test cases have a
much higher successful generation rate (> 70%) than fully directed test cases due
to the simpler analysis involved. The analysis is performed over Android intents to
identify activity transitions using a source-sink concept [10]. A simple listener anal-
ysis is performed to identify actionable GUI elements within each activity. The lists
of actionable widgets are provided in the ATG information for use by the automated
runtime tester. (Please refer to Algorithm 3 in Appendix A)
Automated runtime testing proceeds by trying each potential widget identifier
associated with the current activity, and determining if the resulting activity reached
corresponds to the target node of the current ATG edge. if the target node of the
current edge is not reached, a ’back track’ command is issued to bring the app back
to the source activity. The next potential widget is then tried until the next activity
in the ATG edge is reached.
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Upon reaching the target node in the ATG, the remaining actionable button-
s/widgets identifiers in the source node of the edge is discarded and replaced with
that of the target node. In this way, activity transitions proceed until the target ac-
tivity containing privacy sensitive APIs is reached.
Figure 2.4 displays the format of the semi-directed test cases for 2 target
activities of apps. The transiting activities are in bold, with the widget identifiers
contained within the brackets.
Target Activity: com.interestingcoolerfreegoimbh.app.koisettings
(App: com.interestingcoolerfreegoimbh.apk)
Test Case:
[com.interestingcoolerfreegoimbh.app.menuicon{settings,imageView1,morefreapps
,setwallpaper}; com.interestingcoolerfreegoimbh.app.GalleryWallpaperSettings{image
View1,butt2a,butt1,button1unlock,tvSeekBar11};com.interestingcoolerfreegoimbh.app
.koisettings{unlockbuttommain,backone,textapp}]
Target Activity: com.lyrebirdstudio.promodialog.PromoActivity
(App: com.lyrebirdstudio.montagenscolagem.apk)
Test Case:
[com.lyrebirdstudio.montagenscolagem.SelectPhotoActivity{my awesome toolbar,
montagens show case, montagens main ad id};com.lyrebirdstudio.promodialog
.PromoActivity{}]
Figure 2.4: Example: Format of Semi-Directed Test Cases Built from Callback
Function Analysis For Automated Testing
In the example of Figure 2.4, the test case directs the app towards
target activities called ’com.interestingcoolerfreegoimbh.app.koisettings’
and ’com.lyrebirdstudio.promodialog.PromoActivity’. In order for
’com.interestingcoolerfreegoimbh.app.koisettings’ to be reached, it has to
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transit through 2 other activities, ’com.interestingcoolerfreegoimbh.app.menuicon’
and ’com.interestingcoolerfreegoimbh.app.GalleryWallpaperSettings’. It does so
by filtering and only stimulating user action on the widget identifiers within the
brackets (e.g.{settings, imageView1, morefreapps, setwallpaper}), and discarding
the rest which are not involved in enabling transitions.
2.2.3 Reports on Activity Transition Paths and Results of Static
Analysis
To facilitate reporting of static analysis results, human-readable reports in text for-
mat were outputted in addition to the test cases. Figure 2.5 illustrates the report
outputs of an example app. As can be seen from the report, the information pro-
vided includes:
• Total number/names of activities
• Main (Root) activity of app
• Widget identifiers in directed test cases required to reach each of the activities
• Privacy infringing APIs found
• Target activities that have callgraph links to privacy APIs
• ATG map containing the required activity transitions of each of the activities
in the app
• Widget identifiers corresponding to the ATG map
It should be highlighted that the MAMBA system outputs the results of static
analysis including the ATG and paths of all app activities in the report, but filters
results to generate test cases for automated runtime testing to reach only the target
activities.
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Figure 2.5: Snippet of Human-Readable Report in Text Format on Results of Static
Analysis (MAMBA System)
2.2.4 Automated Runtime App Testing
As mentioned, the Activity Transition Graph (ATG) generated from the analysis in
the previous Subsection 2.2.2 is used to guide traversal of the app from root (main)
activity to any targeted activity within the app. In my model, the ATG nodes are ac-
tivities and graph edges are the directed edges between each activity. Directed edges
contain callback function information of activities, which include widget identifiers
of the GUI components that will cause transitions between any 2 activities defined
in the app. Widget identifiers are utilized for edges because Android’s Hierarchy
Viewer [47] provides visibility on clickable Android UI components from these
identifiers. The ATG representation is shown in Figure 2.6. GATOR’s CCFG class
was utilized as a stub to generate the ATG abstraction.
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From Figure 2.6, the callback function contained by the ATG node as
well as the activity name is highlighted in bold. In the example, the callback
function of the node is ’onCreate’, which represents the starting up of an
Android activity. While the activity containing this callback is of the name
’com.bitsmedia.android.quitpro.activities.PremiumActivity’. The edge contains a
source as well as a target node, and also illustrates the callback functions as well as
activity names in bold. A descriptor is present at the start of the node, indicating
the type of node. In this particular example of the ATG edge, the start node is of an
Android view inflation type, represented by ’Inflate Node’ while the target node is
of an activity start type.
Node (Activity with Callback Functions):
[START] Node 〈Activity[com.bitsmedia.android.quitpro.activities.PremiumActivity],〈com.bitsmedia.android.quitpro.activities.
PremiumActivity: void onCreate(android.os.Bundle) 〉 ,implicit lifecycle event,Activity[com.bitsmedia.android.quitpro.activities.
PremiumActivity] 〉
Edge (Source and Target Activities together with Their Callback Function):
Node〈Inflate Node[android.widget.Button,WID[premiumUpgradeButton]],〈com.bitsmedia.android.quitpro.activities.InfoActivity$1:
void onClick (android.view.View)〉, click, ACT[com.bitsmedia.android.quitpro.activities.InfoActivity]〉 -> [START]
Node〈Activity[com.bitsmedia.android.quitpro.activities.PremiumActivity],〈com.bitsmedia.android.quitpro.activities.PremiumActivity:
void onCreate (android.os.Bundle)〉,implicit lifecycle event,Activity[com.bitsmedia.android.quitpro.activities.PremiumActivity]〈
[normal, start activity, [window must start]]
Figure 2.6: Node & Edge Representations in ATG, containing Callback Information
(Represented with GATOR tool’s CCFG class, which was utilized as a stub)
I built an automated walking tool on top of AMC, which utilizes test cases gen-
erated from the ATG as inputs to guide its testing. Each test case is made up of
the user actions that are required to be sent to the UI to cause activity transitions,
which are executed in sequence one after another. The testing thus proceeds by
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’walking’ the application from the initial root activity to a target activity, before ter-
minating and restarting from the root activity again for the next test case. Testing
now proceeds in a more deterministic and guided fashion, which improves testing
efficiency.
Multiple Paths & Path Feasibility: The analysis encountered cases whereby there
were multiple paths from an activity back to the root activity. While my solution
logs all possible paths, it does not identify which paths are actually feasible or can be
reached during run-time. Infeasible paths might occur if some condition is required
before the next resulting activity can be started. For example, an activity might only
be accessible if the user is on WiFi. Another example could be in a shopping app,
in which a checkout activity might only be accessible if the user had checked on
certain items in a list.
2.2.5 Analysis of Causes of User-Triggered Leaks & Character-
istics
As mentioned, MAMBA’s automated runtime testing produces log files that con-
tain execution traces of the automated tester, information on Android activities and
buttons/widgets that are reached as well as privacy access and leak reports from Pro-
tectMyPrivacy (PMP) [48] and TaintDroid [24]. MAMBA processes the resulting
leak and event log files to obtain useful outputs on the privacy behaviours of apps.
Analysis on App Usage Logs without Static Analysis Outputs
An early version of the tool [37] was based on manual/automated testing without
knowledge from static analysis, and relied on uncovering user-triggered causes of
privacy leaks (leak-cause analysis [36]) using Association Rule Mining [4]. In this
leak-cause analysis, I established linkages between user actions to privacy leaks
using WEKA [30]. The tool converts raw log files to .csv format for input and
processing, and outputs the results into a ’Leak-cause Database’ for storage.
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Association Rule Mining [4] identified correlation based on how frequently two
concerned events (a particular user-action and a particular leak report) occured to-
gether within a chosen time window (5 seconds). The assumption and intuition for
applying this technique is as follows: the leaking behaviour of an application stays
constant with time, similar behaviour is expected to occur repeatedly if sufficient
logs are collected. Thus patterns can be extracted to identify causes of various leak-
ing behaviour. For example, if a news app is reported to leak IMEI as many times
as the ”Load More News” button was touched by the user, it can be inferred that the
user-action of touching this button is highly correlated with the leak of the IMEI in
this app.
The outputs of the analysis are expressed as association rules whose left sides
indicate the causes of the leaks on the right sides. For example: Click of ”Load
More News”→ Leak of IMEI. I utilized the Apriori algorithm available in WEKA
to obtain such association rules with absolute support and confidence thresholds of
2 and 0.5 respectively. The thresholds were tuned based on samples of 20 apps,
and fitted reasonably well with the test logs. For utilization with WEKA, my tool
transforms raw logs into a tabular format as displayed in Figure 2.7. In this format,
each clickable component in the app has a column representing co-occurrence with
leak within the 5 second time window. If yes, it is indicated by a ’True’, otherwise
a ’FALSE’ appears in the tab.
Non user-triggered privacy behaviours (Start-up/Periodic leaks) are also
uncovered by the mining process. For Start-up leak behaviours, instances of app
launches were co-located with leak events within the 5 second window. While
an app was deemed to have periodic privacy leak behaviours when there were
consistent occurrences of leak events at every minute time interval.
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Figure 2.7: Example of Transformed WEKA Table from Raw Logs
MAMBA’s Output of Runtime Verified Privacy Causes
MAMBA outputs a text format human-readable report of runtime verified privacy
causes from the static analysis (Please refer to Figure 2.8). The report lists the
number and names of target activities (activities with privacy-related APIs), target
activities that automated testing managed to reach and coverage percentages, veri-
fied runtime paths towards target activities, the button/widget identifiers acted upon
at runtime to reach these target activities as well as their screen coordinates, privacy
access/leak reports associated with activities, as well as their privacy data types.
Figure 2.8 displays an example of a final report of runtime verification by
MAMBA for an app (com.urbandroid.babysleep.apk). The report lists that all of the
3 target activities (’MainActivity’, ’TutorialActivity’ and ’RecordActivity’) were
reached by automated testing, and had privacy accesses of device identifiers as well
as microphone sensor. The button/widget identifiers and their corresponding on-
screen coordinates which were verified to reach each of these activities are displayed
under the tag ’Widget Clicked’. In this example, the buttons with the ’id/help’ and
’id/record’ identifiers were clicked upon to reach activities ’TutorialActivity’ and
’RecordActivity’ respectively. Each of these identifiers had on-screen display coor-
dinates of ’672 , 106’ and ’209 , 342’.
The verified runtime paths towards these target activities are also displayed in
the example Figure 2.8 under the tag ’Verified Path’. The example shows that the
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Figure 2.8: Human-Readable Final Report in Text Format of MAMBA’s Runtime
Verification
target activities had user-triggered activity transition paths from the main activity
’MainActivity’.
The identifer and coordinate information can be utilized by the customized In-
teractive Privacy Notifications App described in Section 2.3. Whenever the Noti-
fications App detects that the button/widget/view with identifier and coordinates is
being displayed on the user device, it fires off a privacy message which overlays
itself on top of the button. The privacy message displays the data type as well as
privacy implication (data access or leak) of user action. In this manner, users can be
provided with better and more in-depth context of the privacy implications of using
their apps.
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Figure 2.9: Architecture of Parallelized Automated Application Testing System
2.2.6 Scaling up App Testing By Parallelized Test Instances
In order to scale up application testing, I leveraged on parallelization over multiple
Android emulator test instances on commercial clouds (Amazon EC-2) and physi-
cal test phones. Figure 2.9 displays the system architecture for the automated app
testing system.
A Test Machine is a single CPU running either on the Amazon EC-2 cloud or a
physical CPU tethered to physical test phones. Each Test Machine runs a test co-
ordinator program for control and coordination of multiple Testing Instances. Each
Testing Instance is a customized Android OS image, that runs the Android Frame-
work and leak detection instrumentations. These instrumentations allow output of
information about various app states (e.g. app starts, widget draw events, listeners
etc.) and actions of the user (click, key events). From Figure 2.9, each Test Machine
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also runs Process Monitors, Automated Model Checker (AMC), Event Recorders
as well as Sensor Mockers to enable Mobile Forensics testing on the emulator. The
Parallelized Automated Testing System runs on each Test Machine, and has a role
of ensuring smooth and continual testing of mobile apps in a sequential fashion. It
contains fault handling routines for the Android emulator, which is known to suffer
from stability issues [31].
The resulting event logs obtained from the Test Machines are processed by the
Log Mining & Analysis Sub-system. Leakage patterns associates the data leaks to
the actions captured in the logs. Patterns are obtained and stored in a Leak-Cause
Database.
The following component modules of the Parallelized Automated App Testing
System, displayed in Figure 2.9, are described as follows:
1) Application Crawler & Intent Miner: I utilized an existing Android Market
API [17] to create a crawler that discovers and downloads a large number of Android
apps (.APK) from the Google Play Store. With the term search API, a 32,000 word
dictionary [22] was used to discover a list of about 200,000 unique apps from the
store (This is not exhaustive, and more can actually be discovered). Using the list,
the crawler then downloads apps at a rate of 500 apps/hour.
The Intent Miner module extracts apps’ start-up intents and permissions from
their manifest files. The start-up intent provides the means to start the app from
the Test Coordinator, while permissions identify the platform (device or emulator)
the app is suitable to be tested on. The reason is that Android emulators lack
microphone emulation, hence apps that require the microphone permission is
directed to physical test phones instead of the emulator.
2) Test Coordinator: The Test Coordinator ensures that the testing of the applica-
tions on each Testing Instance proceeds in a smooth and sequential fashion. The
inputs to the Test Coordinator are application apk files placed in a specified folder,
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and the outputs are the corresponding test logs saved by individual application
package names. The Coordinator installs the applications on each available Testing
Instance, starts it up, saves the logs upon completion of test and starts up the testing
of the next application automatically. The logs saved include the leak-reports from
TaintDroid, widget and page transition data, all in-application widget and button
clicks/interactions made by the AMC’s MonkeyRunner as well as screen captures
of all unique pages traversed.
3) Process Monitor: To ensure smooth testing and deal with instabilities with the
Android Emulator and the Android Device Bridge(ADB), I developed a Process
Monitor to manage the test processes such as the Android Debug Bridge (ADB),
Model-Checking as well as logger processes. Problems in application testing on the
Android Emulator have been highlighted previously [31], with some works specif-
ically avoiding to run their test processes on the Emulator due to their slow speed
and instabilities. Issues with emulators are aggravated especially for continuous and
prolonged running with multiple instances. It was also observed that zombie ADB
processes tend to accumulate at the end of each application test run, which could
cause additional unwanted memory loads on the test machines causing slowdowns.
As such, the Process Monitor was specifically designed for unhindered testing on
the Android Emulator.
The Process Monitor tracks and monitors the Android Emulator, ADB and other
running binary processes of the front-end testing system. Various fault handling
routines were implemented, including the shutting and restarting of the Emulator,
ADB and Android Linux system processes before and during each test run, if
various stalling conditions occurred. Heuristics were used to determine stalling
or hanging conditions in the test instances. The heuristics were based on whether
the size of test logs and number of images being captured increased continuously
during the testing runs. If the logs captured did not increase by a specified time
(3 minutes), the Process Monitor shuts down and restarts the individual emulator
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and Android SDK processes automatically and continues with the testing instance
until completion. On emulator crashes, appending of logs from the previous testing
process was performed. These implementations worked well to allow proper and
uninterrupted sequential testing of applications.
4) Automated Model Checker (AMC): The default app testing tool utilized is the
Automated Model Checker (AMC) [39] to automatically traverse and explore the
application GUIs. This module is readily switched with my MAMBA automated
tester that I created (Described in Section 2.2). Switching of tester is done with a
simple executable binary file swap.
5) Event Recorder: Event Recorders were implemented for each testing instance
while running the Automated Model Checkers on the test instances. The Event
Recorder automatically logged and saved the traces of the user-interaction with
the layouts and widgets of the application. Data logged included page-transition
notices, widgets and buttons tapped or clicked by the model checker, coordinates of
buttons and layouts accessed by the model checker as well as taint reports provided
by TaintDroid. This includes a screen-capture component to take and save images
of unique pages and layouts in the applications accessed by the model checker. As
the model checker could possibly access the same application page multiple times,
heuristics involving simple matching of some layouts in the pages accessed were
utilized to prevent multiple captures of the same application page to save storage
space.
6) Sensor Mocking: I implemented a simple Sensor Mocking program to send
fake running GPS coordinates to the emulator test devices through the telnet ports.
The purpose of which to elicit similar behaviours and data-leaks to physical phone
devices. The mocking of other sensors besides GPS can be accomplished by the
open-source project Sensor Simulator [28].
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2.3 Notifying Users with Privacy Outputs
With the outputs of user-triggered causes and privacy characteristics of apps uncov-
ered in Section 2.2, the next part of my solution involves effective utilization of its
outputs to improve user privacy. Improvement in user privacy is sought, which is
observed in the form of reduction in user behaviours that cause privacy accesses
and/or leaks. In addition, I seek to investigate if the outputs improve privacy data
recollection and knowledge of the user.
Creation of Visual Leaky Layouts
Creation of Visual Leaky Layouts: For easier notification and illustration of leak
causes and potential users of the rules for end users, a tool was implemented [37]
to utilize the outputs of leak-cause analysis of Section 2.2.5. The tool creates vi-
sual presentations by automatically overlaying outlined coloured boxes on the top
of leaky widgets in the app screen-captures. This enables the leak-cause informa-
tion to be much more user friendly and easier for users to digest. An example of
the generated visual leaky layout is displayed in Figure 2.10. Such visual layouts
can be utilized by an analyst to make quick determinations as to whether apps are
appropriately utilizing privacy data. They can be also shown to app users for more
informed access control decisions of their apps.
Interactive Privacy Leak Notification App
To utilize the outputs of the hybrid static/dynamic app privacy system, an Interactive
Privacy Leak Notifications app was also developed. This Notifications app works on
un-rooted phones, and pulls data from the knowledge-base stored in the ’leak-cause’
database. This app runs an Android service on the user phone, which continuously
monitors the app state that the user is on. On detection of that the user is on a
desired app page, the Notification app fires of privacy messages using Android Toast
Messaging [21]. The toast messages appear on: (i) App Start-Ups, (ii) On the
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Figure 2.10: Visual Overlay of Coloured Boxes on top of Leaky Widgets in App
Screen-Captures by Leak-Cause Analysis Tool
appearance of certain in-app layouts and (iii) Beside culprit buttons/widgets within
the app. The Notifications app works by reading event messages provided by the
Android Accessibility Service [19].
The notification app parses accessibility event messages to infer page transi-
tions, the exact application that users are in as well as the page-layout that users
are currently accessing to determine the exact moments to display notifications to
users. An example of the formatted accessibility event service sequence 4-tuple is:
{1: com.facebook.katana
2: d”ButtonText”e
3: android.widget.EditText
4: Layout Element Count:6}
The first sequence of the 4-tuple above indicates the application package name,
the second sequence refers to the text on the app widget clicked on by the user, the
third sequence indicates the widget type that was clicked upon and the last sequence
provides the element count in the particular layout. I found that for the majority of
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the page transitions within the applications, it was possible to sufficiently identify
the current application page and state that a user is presently on for the field study
in Section 4.2.
To enable proper display of notification message overlays regardless of user-
phone screen size, scaling of the coordinates from the leak-cause database was per-
formed. The coordinates to display message overlays were scaled over the test
device (Galaxy Nexus) to user device screen sizes. i.e... x − Coordinate =
Display x−Coodinate
Test Device Length
×User Device Length , y−Coordinate = Display y−Coodinate
Test Device Height
×
User Device Height.
2.4 Initial Feasibility Study on Uncovering User-
Triggered Privacy Leaks and Characteristics of
Apps
In this section, I present the results of an initial feasibility study for uncovering
user-triggered privacy leaks and privacy characteristics of Android apps (Privacy
’Leak-Causes’). I also investigate the taxonomy of app privacy leak behaviours.
This study was performed using manual testing of apps.
Empirical Study: Taxonomy of Privacy ’Leak-Causes’
An empirical study was performed on popular apps from the Google Play store [1]
to observe the proportions of apps with user-triggers, as well as to study the
taxonomy of app privacy leak behaviours.
Applications: I sampled the top 10 apps from the (previously) 22 categories from
the Google Play store during Nov 2012. (Total 226 apps) The 6 additional apps
were randomly added to make up for cases where some apps crashed.
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Figure 2.11: Distribution of Various Leak Causes
Testing Environment: The test was performed on a Google Nexus one phone
running Android v2.3.4 with a custom ROM that includes TaintDroid leak detec-
tor [24] and the relevant OS instrumentations to capture UI events and user-actions.
Taxonomy of Leaky Applications: Out of the 226 apps studied, 121 apps were
found not to be leaking private data (non-leaking apps). Among the 105 apps
(46.5%) leaking privacy data, 64 apps (28.3%) were found to leak private data due
to user actions on application widgets. With leak-cause analysis, I defined a taxon-
omy of privacy leak behaviours for apps, based on the observation of how apps can
leak data: (1) User-Triggered Leaks (identified by association rules), (2) Start-Up
or One-Time Leaks, and (3) Periodic Leaks. Defining such a taxonomy helps in
properly classifying and describing the privacy leak behaviours of apps.
The distribution of the 105 apps with various leak causes is shown in Fig-
ure 2.11. 32.4% (34) of the leaky apps leak private data solely due to (1)
User-Triggered actions on widgets. 13.3% (14) leak solely on (2) Start-Up. 20%
(21) leak data solely in a (3) Periodic fashion. 21.9% (23) can leak data by either (1)
User-Triggers or (2) Start-Up. 2.9% (3) leak data either by (1) User-Triggers or (3)
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Periodically. 3.8% (4) applications leak data by any of the three means. 5.7% (6)
have no User-Triggered leaks, but leak data both on (2) Start-up and (3) Periodically.
Distribution of Leak Data Types: Figure 2.12 shows the distribution of various
types of private data that was leaked by the test apps. 9 different leaked data types
have been found: {Phone Contacts, GPS Location, ICCID (SIM card identifier),
IMEI, Last-Known Location, Location (Non-GPS), Microphone Input, Net-based
Location, Phone Number}. It is noticed that a majority of leaks are of 3 types:
IMEI, Location (Non-GPS), and Net-Based location. As most of the processes in
the applications required an active internet connection, it is unsurprising perhaps
that much of the private data leaked is of their Net-Based location, which is the
coarse-grained geographical location obtained from mobile users’s IP addresses.
However, it is surprising that many applications are leaking IMEIs and non-GPS lo-
cation, which is the user location obtained from cellular towers, to external servers.
From our observation, IMEIs are often used (but possibly unnecessary) as a unique
identifier to link mobile users to activities such as user feedback, comments, and
record-keeping for access when requesting server-based information by the appli-
cations.
2.4.1 Accuracy of Association Rules Mining
User-triggered leaks and privacy characteristics were uncovered by the mining of
user-triggered causes and characteristics of privacy leaks from the outputs and logs
of mobile app testing described in Section 2.2.5. As mentioned, the processing of
logs is performed using Association Rules Mining with the WEKA machine learning
tool. Whereby app user-triggers and pages with privacy leaks that are correlated
with privacy reports (i.e. have high support and confidence values) are outputted for
building of a knowledge base in the form of a ’leak-cause’ database for advisory to
users.
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Figure 2.12: Distribution of Types of Leaked Data
Figure 2.13 displays the accuracy results of the association rules mining as a
distribution. An overall mining accuracy of 67% was obtained. These accuracies
were obtained based on a manual pattern validation across a set of 64 apps with
user-triggered privacy leaks. Accuracy is defined to be the percentage of leak causes
that have been defined to be correct, out of the total number of leak causes returned
from the miner. It can be observed that the miner is very accurate (80-100%) for
37.5% (24) of the apps. However, there was a small percentage of apps with poor
accuracies (<40) - 26.6% (9) apps. Some of the reasons for lower accuracies are
highlighted next.
Causes of Mining Inaccuracies: Based on manual inspections of apps with lower
accuracies, I highlight a few reasons. It was observed that there were situations
where multiple non-leaky widgets were often situated in close proximity to a
leaky widget on the screen layouts. This often caused false positives due to these
non-leaky widgets showing up as false candidates in the Association Rules mining.
Co-occurrences of start-up/periodic leaks together with user-triggered leaks can
confuse the rule mining and cause false positives. Also, there are situations in
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which widgets might leak infrequently (e.g. only once before stopping), and this
contributes to false negatives. Also, it is also known that TaintDroid tool may
generate false positives due to the usage of tag aggregation at various points in the
system to reduce storage costs. All these reasons contribute to mining inaccuracies.
2.4.2 Feasibility in Creation of a ’Leak-Cause’ Database
I built a knowledge-base of app leak causes from Mobile Forensics back-end test-
ing framework (’Leak-Cause’ Database). Building such a knowledge-base can
help to enhance the usability and trustworthiness of app stores. Notifications can
be performed by a customized 3rd-party app that I created, that is linked up to
this ’Leak-Cause’ Database. The database contains relevant information pertain-
ing to the leak behaviours of the apps: Types of private data leaks, leak-widgets
identified by the leak-cause miner, characteristics of leaks from taxonomy (User-
triggered, Start-Up, Periodic), App name, screen-captures, legitimacy recommen-
dations etc. Table 2.1 shows sample database contents for 4 apps: ’Dictionary’,
’HungryGoWhere’, ’GMail’ and ’MessengerWithYou’.
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No. App Name Leaks Found Association Rules(Sample) Leak Behaviour Recommended?
1 Dictionary.com 1) Location 1)(ImageView #1)→ (Location)+(Net-based Location) -Start-up No
2) Net-based Location 2)(ImageView #2)→ (Location)+(Net-based Location) -User-Triggered
3)(TextView #1)→ (Net-Based)+(Location)
4) (Button #1) + (ImageView #3)
→ (Location)+(Net-based Location)
2 HungryGoWhere 1) ICCID (SIM Card Identifier) 1)(TextView #1)→ (ICCID)+(IMEI) -Start-up No
2) IMEI 2)(LinearLayout #1)→ (ICCID)+(IMEI) -User-Triggered
3)(LinearLayout #2)→ (ICCID)+(IMEI)
4) (RelativeLayout #1)→ (ICCID)+(IMEI)
3 Gmail 1) Address Book (Phone Contacts) 1)(LinearLayout #1)→ (Address Book)+(Phone Book) -User-Triggered Yes
2) Phone No. +(GPS Location)+(Net-based Location)
3) GPS Location 2)(Button #1)→ (Address Book)+(Phone Book)
4) Net-based Location +(GPS Location)+(Net-based Location)
4 Messenger WithYou 1) IMEI 1)(Button #1)→ (IMEI) -User-Triggered Yes
2)(Button #2)→ (IMEI)
3)(Button #3)→ (IMEI)
4)(Button #4)→ (IMEI)
Table 2.1: Example of Content Fields in Leak-Cause Database
As an example from Table 2.1, the rule 1) for ’Dictionary.com’ indicates that
touching ’ImageView #1’ would leak users’ locations. The leaky widgets can be
uniquely identified by 8-digit java has code identifiers and (x,y) layout coordinates,
with their corresponding leak type associations. A total of 647 leak causes were
mined from the 64 apps with user-triggered leaks. I thus demonstrated that a leak-
cause database can be created for privacy notifications to the mobile user. Infor-
mation from this database can be utilized by an Interactive Privacy Leak Reporter,
which I describe in Section 2.3.
2.5 Scaled-Up Testing Experiment with Parallelized
App Testing System
I ran the parallelized Automated Testing System described in Section 2.2.6 on a set
of 1,700 Android apps downloaded from the Application Crawler. The apps were
selected to provide an equal representation among popular and unpopular applica-
tions, and consisted of 840 applications from the 26 most popular categories on
Google Play as well as a set of 890 randomly selected applications which are not in
any of the popular categories.
I utilized 10x Amazon EC-2 cloud machines to run Android Emulator Testing
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Total # of Apps 1,700
# of Apps with Privacy Leaks 462
Average Running Time per
Application
17.9 minutes
Average # of Unique Pages
Transited per Application
6.3
Table 2.2: Run-Time Statistics in Automated Testing Experiment
instances, as well as 3 actual physical Android phones (2 x Galaxy Nexus; 1 x
Nexus 4). While it was found that up to 3 emulator test instances could be run on
a quad-core CPU machine with 4GB RAM, it would be more cost effective to run
a single emulator test instance on a dual-core CPU machine with 2GB RAM in the
EC-2 cloud. I set a maximum memory allocation of 768 MB for each emulator, and
an upper-bound running time of 60 minutes for each application.
Some statistics of the experiment is as shown in Table 2.2. Of the 1,700 appli-
cations tested, we found that 462 applications (27.2%) leak user-data to the external
network. The average running time of each application was 17.9 minutes (upper
bounded by 60 mins), and it was found that the model checker traversed through an
average of 6.3 unique pages per application. In this case, a unique page is defined
to be a page that has a significantly different layout (greater than 3 layout widget-
s/views) than the rest of the pages in the application. In total, 507 machine hours
were utilized for the testing of all applications.
In the run-time testing experiment performed in [39], the exploration times
required for the apps had a large variation from 10 minutes to over 10 hours. As the
aim is to simply to illustrate an automated approach for user-centric leaks, the de-
sign choice was to upper bound the run-time to 60 mins/app. However, it is possible
for all testing to proceed to full coverage if a larger number of machines are utilized.
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Coverage Measurements of App Testing: I performed activity coverage measure-
ments for a number of 187 randomly selected apps. After decompiling, the An-
droidManifest and XML layout resources of these decompiled apps were analyzed
to obtain a measure of the number of unique layouts and pages required for model
checking. This was then compared to the number of actual unique pages accessed
by the Automated Testing System. The results are displayed in Figure 2.14. 83
of the 187 applications (44.4%) had a coverage of more than 80%, 39 applications
(20.9%) had a coverage of between 40% to 80%, while 65 applications (34.8%) had
a coverage of less than 39%.
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Figure 2.14: Distributions in Application Activity Coverage (Percentage)
Processing of Leak-Causes: I performed processing and discovery of leak-causes
and characteristics for the apps. The apps were classified into 3 forms of leak char-
acteristics: Applications that leak a users’ privacy data on (i) Start-up, (ii) In a Pe-
riodic fashion and (iii) On User-Triggers. As before, frequent item-set mining was
utilized. For every occurrence of a leak event reported by TaintDroid in the log files
of each application, a look-back window of 5 seconds to co-locate user-activities
with these leak events. Similarly for Start-up leak behaviours, instances of appli-
cation launches were co-located to leak events within a 5 second window as well.
For Periodic leakage characteristics, consistent occurrences of at least 1 leak event
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# of User-Triggered Leak
Rules Found
# of Applications
1-3 11
4-6 72
>6 5
Table 2.3: Distribution of Numbers of User-Triggered Leak Rules Found
at every minute time intervals were identified. The data leak was deemed to be peri-
odic if at least 75% of the minute time intervals had a leak report. WEKA [30] was
utilized with absolute support values of value 2. Targeted re-testing was performed
on leaking apps to validate the leak characteristics.
Table 2.3 presents a distribution of the number of user-triggered leak rules
for 88 applications found to leak user-data on pressing in-app widgets. Of these
applications, 11 were found to have 1 to 3 triggers, a majority of 72 applications
had 4 to 6 triggers and 5 applications had more than 6 user triggers that cause
privacy leaks. These results illustrate that most user-triggered leaky applications
typically have between 4 to 6 widgets that would cause a privacy leak when clicked.
Distribution & Characteristics of Leaks Found: Figures 2.15 displays the propor-
tions of applications displaying each of the 3 different leak characteristics and the
types of user leaks found respectively in the 462 applications. 148 applications
(32.0%) were found to have start-up leaks, 378 applications (81.8%) were found to
have periodic leaks, and 88 applications (19.0%) of the applications had leaks due
to user triggers.
Figure 2.16 highlights the types and numbers of leaks found in the applica-
tions. The leaks were found to disclose users’ physical locations, address books,
protected storage (SMSes, Photo & Media Files etc.), phone identity (IMEI) as well
as the SIM card identifier (ICCID). A large number of 337 applications were found
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Figure 2.16: Types of Privacy Leaks Found
to disclose user protected storage, while a surprisingly large number of 250 appli-
cations disclosed the address book to an external server.
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Chapter 3
Evaluation Results of MAMBA
System
In this chapter, I compare my automated testing solution, the MAMBA system, to
another testing solution, the Automated Model Checker (AMC) [39]. The compar-
ison is performed over 500 Android apps, with the comparisons metrics being the
(i) Testing Times Required (Latency), (ii) Activity Coverage, as well as the (iii)
Precision of my MAMBA testing in uncovering runtime privacy accesses/leaks.
3.1 The Automated Model Checker (AMC)
I provide some preliminaries on the Automated Model-Checker (AMC), which is
an automated app testing solution for Android apps from MobiSys 2013 [39]. In
AMC, no target activities were specified, but available user-actions for each click-
able widget/button on each activity encountered were ordered sequentially in a top-
to-bottom fashion based on the layout and each tried in-turn. On reaching a next
activity state, the app was backtracked to the previous activity before selection of
another clickable widget/button for tapping. In this fashion, AMC tries to reach all
activities in the app. AMC is based on state equivalence heuristics, and the com-
parisons of the app states that automated testing has reached after performing user
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actions on app widgets.
After the inputs of user actions, activity transitions might not necessary occur.
And many user actions might not necessarily cause transitions but merely changes in
the activity’s state (For example clicking a view causes some additional information
to be displayed).
While it isn’t difficult for a human to deduce whether an activity transition has
occurred instead of merely view changes, the problem is not trivial for a machine.
AMC solves this problem by calculating structural hashes of the current activity and
comparing it to that of a previous state. An activity transition is deemed to have oc-
curred if the structural hashes calculated are different. AMC also holds in memory
a collection of states that testing has already reached, and builds an transitional rep-
resentation of all states visited at runtime. In addition, it uses equivalence heuristics
to determine if multiple transitions from a particular activity closely resemble each
other. If it does, it deduces that it is only sufficient to test the first few buttons in the
page. (For example, it is sufficient to test only the first few news items in an news
list of an activity)
AMC does not hold any prior knowledge of activity transitions of apps, but
builds up this transitional knowledge during runtime testing. This is in contrast to
MAMBA, which obtains activity transitional information of apps from static anal-
ysis prior to runtime testing. While this speeds up runtime testing, a downside of
MAMBA is that additional processing time is required for static analysis. However,
as the program sizes of mobile platforms are designed to be compact, the times
required for static analysis will usually not be exceedingly large.
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3.2 Small-Scale Evaluation of MAMBA using
GATOR’s Callback Analysis
I present the results of a small-scale evaluation of 24 apps using MAMBA with test
cases generated by GATOR’s [53] Callback Analysis (MAMBA-GATOR). Testing
time required as well as activity coverage of MAMBA was evaluated against the Au-
tomated Model Checker (AMC) [39]. The test cases generated were entirely fully-
directed with no semi-directed ones. As mentioned in previous sections, GATOR’s
Callback Analysis was found to have a low success rate. The test apps were thus
selected based on apps which could be successfully processed.
3.2.1 Results of AMC Comparison with MAMBA-GATOR
The total time required for each of the 24 apps for both AMC and MAMBA-GATOR
are displayed in Table 3.1. AMC results are displayed in column ’AMC (Testing
Time)’, and consists of time for runtime testing in ’[hh:mm:ss]’ format. The total
testing time required for MAMBA-GATOR is a combination of the time required
for static test case generation as well as the automated running of the test cases on
the automated tester.
The total testing times required for AMC Model Checking ranged from over
2 minutes (0:02:32) to more than 3 hours (3:23:10). This is comparison to total
testing time required for MAMBA-GATOR’s directed testing (’MAMBA-GATOR -
Total [hh:mm:ss]’), which ranged from 2 minutes (0:02:04) to just over 15 minutes
(0:15:40). These testing total times required for MAMBA-GATOR were therefore
significantly shorter than that required for AMC. MAMBA-GATOR was 6.1 times
faster across all the 24 apps (Average 0:31:15 compared to 0:05:03), and was up to
58 times faster (No. 21 app: ’Speak Mandarin Free’).
Sensitive APIs & Target Activities of Interest: From Table 3.1, the Privacy Sensi-
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AMC
(Testing Time)
MAMBA - GATOR
(Testing Time)
No. App Name Package Privacy
Data
Total No. of
Activities
No. of Target
Activities
Total
[hh:mm:ss]
Test Case
Generation [s]
Test Case
Running [s]
Total
[hh:mm:ss]
1 Album Cover Finder com.ftpcafe.coverart
.trial
GPS 8 6 1:18:25 59 337 0:06:36
2 A+ Certification Lite com.mhazzm.APlus
Certification702Lite
GPS 4 1 0:03:10 45 101 0:02:26
3 Advanced Task Killer com.rechild.advan
cedtaskkiller
GPS 6 1 1:04:11 47 140 0:03:07
4 African American
Quotes
com.hmobile.african
americanquote
GPS 11 11 1:18:18 37 610 0:10:47
5 Android Book App com.appmk.book.main GPS 5 3 0:19:41 56 146 0:03:22
6 Arsenal Fan Club com.arsenalfanclub Nil 9 0 0:46:55 57 N.A. Nil
7 Blood Alcohol Tracker com.promille GPS 7 7 0:27:00 32 411 0:07:23
8 Call and SMS
Easy Blocker
com.ekaisar.android.eb GPS, Contact
-List ,SMSes
9 2 0:17:17 94 168 0:04:22
9 Car Performance Free com.unnull.apps
.carperformancefree
GPS 7 2 0:12:51 26 224 0:04:10
10 CLT vs. PJ com.neocode.cltxpj GPS 3 3 0:03:35 30 185 0:03:35
11 Driving Skill Monitor com.drismo GPS 14 3 0:34:09 50 216 0:04:26
12 Fat Burning Foods com.v1 4.fatburning
foods.com
GPS, IMEI 15 15 0:11:27 42 535 0:09:37
13 Font for Galaxy com.hongik
.fontomizerSP
GPS 2 2 0:03:09 38 114 0:02:32
14 Interesting Cooler com.interestingcooler
freegoimbh.app
GPS 10 1 0:17:56 55 69 0:02:04
15 Interpret Your Dream com.dreamforth.iyd GPS 6 6 0:06:01 34 296 0:05:30
16 JaquecApp com.terranology
.jaquecapp
GPS 18 1 0:37:35 49 109 0:02:38
17 My Display Check com.jensu
.screenchecker
GPS 7 7 0:15:40 30 357 0:06:27
18 Shikoku Railway com.appspot.norit
subushi.shikoku
GPS 6 6 0:20:49 38 422 0:07:40
19 Solar Battery Charger com.solar.charger
.battery
GPS 3 2 0:07:12 39 123 0:04:42
20 Space War APK com.space war
free 10
GPS, IMEI
Phone No.
13 10 0:19:26 40 900 0:15:40
21 Speak Mandarin Free com.chineseskill.lan
tool.sc
Microphone,
Device IDs
3 2 3:23:10 61 148 0:03:29
22 Super Runner Boy com.pack.Super
-RunnerBoyTrial
GPS 4 1 0:02:32 68 80 0:02:28
23 TooLate Lateness afw.allforweb.toolate Contacts 6 1 0:08:34 42 95 0:02:17
24 Trios Labs Reader com.triosLabs
.hadithreader
GPS 8 8 0:26:47 47 313 0:06:00
Table 3.1: Results of Automated Testing - (Model-Checking) AMC vs. Graph-
Directed Tester (MAMBA)
tive API association of Section 2.2.1 uncovered that 21 apps accessed users’ GPS
data, 2 of the apps accessed the Contact List, 3 apps Device Identifiers, and 1 app
each accessed users’ Microphone and SMSes. 1 app (Arsenal Fan Club) did not
access any privacy data. The total no. of activities each app contained as well as the
no. of activities found to be accessing user privacy data are illustrated in the table.
The apps were found to each contain between 2 to 18 activities in total. 10
of the 24 apps had 100% of their activities accessing privacy data, with varying
numbers (0-100%) for the rest. These privacy accessing activities were flagged out
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to be reached by the directed tester.
Generating Test Cases for Directed Testing: The processing times required for gen-
erating test cases for target activities of each app are tabulated in Table 3.1 (sec-
onds). Test Case Generation time includes bytecode and CCFG generation, CCFG
traversal and search for paths as well, Privacy Sensitive API association as the gen-
eration of user-action sequences for the automated tester. Test cases were generated
on an AMD Opteron 4386, 3.1GHz CPU and running 64-bit Debian Linux.
Test Case Generation took between 26 to 94 seconds for each app (Under
column ’MAMBA-GATOR : Test Case Generation (s)’). The results indicated that
generation time had no clear relation with the total number of activities in the app
or the number of target activities, although it may be dependent on app size and
complexity. An example was the No. 12 app: ’Fat Burning Foods’, which had 15
activities in total and 15 target activities, but required 42 seconds for processing.
This is in comparison to No. 2 app: ’A+ Certification Lite’ that required a longer
generation time of 45 seconds but had smaller number of only 4 activities and 1
target activity.
Running Test Cases: The testing times required for running the resulting test cases
on an automated tester are tabulated under the column ’MAMBA-GATOR: Test
Case Running (s)’. Automated testing performed on 3 hardware Galaxy Nexus de-
vices running Android OS 4.1.1 which were connected to a testing program running
on a Windows 7 machine. Testing can be carried out on emulators as well, but we
only utilized hardware devices for consistency in this evaluation.
Running a single test case took about over a minute on average. Automated app
testing took between 69 seconds (1 minute 9 seconds) to 900 seconds (15 minutes)
for each app, and were dependent on the number of target activities as well as the
number of test cases.
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Discussion on Findings
Why is my Solution Faster? MAMBA-GATOR’s Graph-Aided Directed Testing
was faster due to the immediate and expedited transitions to target activities via
app buttons that were already known beforehand from test cases built. This was in
contrast to AMC, which had to spend time exploring all clickable UI components in
each app activity, many of which might cause state changes but not activity transi-
tions. Examples of such occurrences are Apps #1, #4 and #21, which required over
1-3+ hours respectively.
The branching structure of activity transitions also played a part to increase test
times in AMC. From inspection, apps with more highly cascaded activity transitions
required more time in AMC Testing, due to the time required for back-tracking to
previous activities, which graph-directed testing did not require.
It can be observed that there were situations where MAMBA-GATOR testing
was only slightly faster than AMC. (For example for App No. 15: ’Interpret Your
Dream’ and App No. 22: ’Super Runner Boy’.) From manual inspection of the
apps, these arose in circumstances where activity transitions were only branched
around the root (main) activity, such that the automated tester only needed to explore
all buttons on the root activity page to transit to other activities within the app.
It is highlighted that the GATOR’s CCFG analysis generated only contains ex-
plicit activity starting (’startActivity’) intents and do not include implicit intents.
Explicit intents consists of activity type classes that have been defined within de-
veloper code of the app, while implicit intents consists of transitions to external
window states (e.g. Transit from app to a web browser or email client).
Coverage of Target Activities
Figure 3.1 displays the Coverage of Target Activities (%) over the Total Testing
Time (seconds) for 3 example apps (App #1, #4 and #20). Although AMC was also
able to cover target activities, it required significantly higher testing times com-
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pared to MAMBA-GATOR. It can be seen that the Coverage of Target Activities
in graph-directed testing converges faster compared to AMC. Coverage of activities
in directed testing proceeded at a steady pace until completion, compared to the
prolonged times required and stagnation at certain activity points for AMC.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
C
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
 o
f
 T
a
r
g
e
t
 A
c
t
i v
i t
i e
s
 (
%
)
Total Testing Time (Seconds)
App #1 (Exhaustive Test)
App #1 (Graph-Directed Test)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
C
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
 o
f
 T
a
r
g
e
t
 A
c
t
i v
i t
i e
s
 (
%
)
Total Testing Time (Seconds)
App #4 (Exhaustive Test)
App #4 (Graph-Directed Test)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
C
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
 o
f  
T
a
r
g
e
t
 A
c
t
i v
i t
i e
s
 (
%
)
Total Testing Time (Seconds)
App #20 (Exhaustive Test)
App #20 (Graph-Directed Test)
Figure 3.1: Coverage of Target Activities (%) over Total Testing Time (Seconds)
for 3 Example Apps - (Left- App #1: ”Album Cover Finder”; Middle- App #4:
”African American Quotes” ; Right- App #20: ”Space War APK”)
Both my graph-directed testing solution and AMC were each able to cover 86
of the 101 target activities in Table 3.1 (85.1% coverage). From inspection, the
remaining activities were inaccessible by our testers due to a few reasons. The
first was that there were some defunct activities which were defined by developers
and in app code, but did not contain start intents. There were also a few which
required some hard to fulfil conditions that normal user events could not meet. For
example, App #11: Driving Skill Monitor had an activity that required input from
GPS sensors for a certain distance before it could be accessed. App #20: Space
War APK had 3 activities that required completion of game levels before it could be
accessed. Allowing coverage for such activities falls outside the scope of my work.
Verification of Privacy Usage Behaviour in Apps
Leak reports from 2 privacy detectors, PMP and TaintDroid were logged during the
automated test runs. PMP detected run-time privacy data accesses, while TaintDroid
was able to detect privacy leaks over the network. Based on the logs captured from
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graph-directed testing, I verified that 45 of the 101 target activities (44.6%, over
13 apps) had privacy data accesses, and 27 of these activities (26.7%, over 8 apps)
leaked private data to the network. Such privacy behaviours can be recorded in off-
line databases for future notification to users. The logs from AMC also indicated the
same findings, which showed that my Directed-Testing solution was able to perform
verification of privacy usage behaviour in apps just as well as exhaustively testing
the app, but in a significantly reduced time.
3.3 Large-Scale Evaluation & Comparison of
MAMBA with Automated Model Checker
(AMC)
In this section, I present the results of a larger scale evaluation & comparison of my
MAMBA system with the Automated Model-Checker (AMC). This was conducted
on a set of 500 apps crawled from the Google Playstore. In contrast to the smaller-
scale evaluation described in previous Section 3.2, which had a low successful anal-
ysis rate, the test cases were generated entirely by MAMBA’s Callback Analysis
without using GATOR. My evaluation metrics were testing times required for test
completion (latency), coverage/recall of target activities that had privacy infringing
APIs, as well as precision in uncovering activities with privacy accesses/leaks.
3.3.1 Conduct of the Experiment
In this section, I describe the test conditions under which the experiments were
carried out. 500 test apps were analyzed each by MAMBA as well as by AMC.
The parallelized app testing system described in Section 2.2.6 was utilized to scale
up testing of both testers, with phone images running both PMP and TaintDroid
to detect data accesses and leaks. APK binaries were installed on test devices and
tested sequentially, with test logs being saved and processed at the end of testing.
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For the MAMBA system, testing consists of static analysis of apks to uncover
paths and target activities, generation of test cases followed by apk installation and
automated testing on physical devices. For AMC testing, testing consists of only
apk installation and automated testing steps. A maximum time limit of 3 hours/app
was set on AMC. The results of testing of MAMBA and AMC are then compiled
and compared side-by-side.
Test Environment and Selection of Test Apps
Test cases were generated on an AMD Opteron 4386, 3.1GHz CPU running 64-
bit Debian Linux. The test cases were then transferred to parallelized app testing
instances running on a Quad-core i7, 2.2GHz laptop CPU running Windows 7, with
multiple Android test devices tethered with a multi-port USB hub. The Android
devices utilized were Galaxy Nexus phones running Android 4.1.2.
The static analysis, consisting of privacy API association to identify target activ-
ities as well as uncovering testing paths towards these activities, was performed on a
set of 1,000 apps. These apps were crawled from the Google Playstore, with an even
distribution of apps from the 26 app categories. From the 1,000 apps, it was found
that just over 400 apps (40%) invoked at least one privacy sensitive API. 500 test
apps were then randomly selected from this set of 1,000 app to provide a roughly
equal distribution of apps with privacy APIs (230 apps from 400 privacy-related
apps; 270 from remaining 600 apps).
The MAMBA, AMC and parallelized test coordination and logging programs
were packaged and ran as Python and Java binaries (.jar) on separate threads on the
i7 laptop CPU. The logs were saved and processed into designated folders under the
name of individual apk files.
46 out of the 230 apps with privacy-related APIs required user login. Accounts
were created for these apps manually, and the automated testing was performed on
these apps in their logged-in state.
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3.3.2 Results of Comparison of MAMBA with AMC
After running MAMBA and AMC on the 500 test apps, the testing times required
and coverage of target activities are then compared. The results demonstrated that
MAMBA has advantages in significantly reduced overall testing times of apps for
reaching the specified targeted activities, and verifying runtime privacy access-
es/leaks (13.18 minutes/app compared to 51.86 minutes/app). Only a small trade-off
in a slightly reduced coverage of target activities (70.33% by AMC to 63.96% by
MAMBA) was required.
The precision of MAMBA’s static analysis in uncovering runtime app privacy
behaviours was 79.84% for data accesses and 35.66% for data leaks. MAMBA also
had recall values of 68.90% for data accesses and 56.10% for data leaks, as mea-
sured relative to privacy behaviours uncovered by AMC. These results are explained
in the next sections.
Testing Time Required for App Testing (Latency)
We compare the testing times required for both MAMBA and AMC for the 500
apps. MAMBA’s required testing time was 13.18 minutes/app compared to 51.86
minutes/app for AMC across 500 apps. We take a closer look and differentiate
the testing times required for 2 distinct groups of apps: (i) Apps with at least
one privacy-related API (#1-#230), and (ii) Apps with No privacy-related APIs
(#231-#500). Figures 3.2 and 3.3 displays the distribution of testing times required
for (i) and (ii) respectively. The testing times for AMC are in blue, while MAMBA’s
plot is in red.
(i) Apps with at least one Privacy-Related API: Figure 3.2 displays the distribution
of total app testing times required for each of the apps with at least one privacy-
related API (Apps #1-#230). AMC has a mean testing time of 57.11 minutes/app
(Std. Deviation = 58.93) - (Min.: 0.67 minutes; Max.: 208.3 minutes) compared
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Figure 3.2: Distribution Plot of Total Testing Time (Mins) against App Number
(#1-#230) for (i) Apps with at least one Privacy-Related API: MAMBA (Red) -
(Mean=21.52 mins/app, Std. Dev.=21.91) ; AMC (Blue) - (Mean=57.11 mins/app,
Std. Dev.=58.93)
to MAMBA’s mean testing time of 21.52 minutes/app (Std. Deviation = 21.91) -
(Min.: 0.25 minutes; Max.: 120.68 minutes). From the graph’s distribution, it can
be observed that the testing times required for MAMBA is dominantly lower for the
vast majority of apps compared to AMC.
It can be observed from Figure 3.2 that there were a few apps for AMC with
total testing time larger than the 3 hour time limit set. This was due to the actual
runtime being longer than the programmed time limit, due to the presence of other
processes (e.g. writing of test logs, installation of app etc.) that were also involved
in the testing.
(ii) Apps with No Privacy-Related API: Figure 3.3 displays the distribution of total
app testing times required for each of the apps with no privacy-related APIs (Apps
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Figure 3.3: Distribution Plot of Total Testing Time (Mins) against App Num-
ber (#231-#500) for (ii) Apps with No Privacy-Related API: MAMBA (Red) -
(Mean=6.08 mins/app, Std. Dev.=8.16) ; AMC (Blue) - (Mean=47.40 mins/app,
Std. Dev.=55.35)
#231-#500). AMC has a mean testing time of 47.40 minutes/app (Std. Deviation =
55.35) - (Min.: 0.02 minutes; Max.: 221.73 minutes) compared to MAMBA’s mean
testing time of 6.08 minutes/app (Std. Deviation = 8.16) - (Min.: 0.08 minutes;
Max. 48.95 minutes). From the graph’s distribution, the testing time required for
MAMBA is clearly much lower across all apps. This is because for MAMBA, apps
with no privacy-related APIs do not require runtime testing and time is only required
to be spent on static analysis.
Coverage of Target Activities
We measure the extent by which MAMBA and AMC is able to reach the specified
activities that have been uncovered by MAMBA’s privacy API association analysis
of Section 2.2.1. Coverage is measured based on the ability of both testers to reach
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Figure 3.4: Distribution Plot of Coverage of Target Activities against App Number
Coverage for AMC (Blue) - (Mean=70.33%) and MAMBA (Red) - (Mean=63.95%)
the activity at runtime. AMC was able to cover on average, 70.33% of target activi-
ties compared to 63.95% of MAMBA. This means that MAMBA only had a slight
decrease in the coverage as compared to AMC. Figure 3.4 illustrates the coverage
distribution of AMC (Blue) and MAMBA (Red). It can be observed that there is no
large discernable difference across the apps.
For the target activities that could be reached by AMC but not MAMBA, this
was due to imperfections in some of the test cases generated. There were some
transitional or widget identifier information that MAMBA’s static analysis was un-
able to output. Also, an observation is that certain apps had target activities that
could not be reached by both AMC and MAMBA. A reason is that there were some
defunct or dead activity-code that were uncovered during the static analysis, but
were actually unreachable at runtime. There were also some activities that required
some complex sequences of user inputs or situations. (For example, some activities
required user-location to move a certain distance to be displayed, or the input of
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special keystrokes) Reaching such activities fall outside the scope or capabilities of
MAMBA or AMC.
There were also a small number of target activities that MAMBA could reach
but not AMC. This illustrates that in some cases, MAMBA’s concept of pre-
computing paths prior to runtime testing can have advantages in better reachability.
Overall Coverage: AMC had an overall activity coverage of 36.99% compared to
21.97% for MAMBA. For AMC, this could be attributed to the time bounding of
AMC to 3 hours and the presence of dead activity code. Whereas for MAMBA,
the low overall coverage was due to the condition that only test cases towards target
activities were ran. However, these values also illustrate that MAMBA only needs
to cover a smaller proportion of overall activities within the apps compared to AMC
to be able to reach and test the required targeted activities.
Accuracy in Detection (Precision & Recall) of Privacy-Infringing Android Ac-
tivities
We measure MAMBA’s accuracy in uncovering privacy accessing and privacy leak-
ing Android activities. As mentioned, the PMP and TaintDroid runtime detectors
were instrumented for detection. By definition, privacy behaviours detected at run-
time are assumed to be the ground truth. Within the test apps, MAMBA was able
to output 206 activities that had privacy data accesses, and 92 activities with data
privacy leaks with complete accuracy.
We next measure the accuracy (precision/recall) of MAMBA’s static analysis.
We define the precision to be the number of correctly detected privacy access-
ing/leaking activities over the number of accessing/leaking activities that MAMBA
outputted. Recall for MAMBA is defined to be the number of correctly detected
accessing/leaking activities by MAMBA over all accessing/leaking activities found
by AMC. The total number of privacy accessing/leaking activities detected during
AMC’s runtime testing was used as an estimate for all true privacy-related activities.
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This estimate is reasonable because AMC does not have a set target for exploration,
but attempted to reach all activities within the app.
MAMBA’s precision in outputting privacy accessing activities was 79.84% (206
activities/258 activities), and 35.66% (92 activities/258 activities) for privacy leak-
ing activities. MAMBA’s recall in outputting privacy accessing activities was 68.9%
(206 activities/299 activities), and 56.10% (92 activities/164 activities) for privacy
leaking activities.
The 270 apps with no privacy-related behaviours were tested by AMC to detect
any privacy behaviours. It was found that MAMBA was very accurate in detecting
apps that had no privacy-related behaviours. Across the 270 apps that MAMBA
flagged to be non privacy invasive, there were only 1 app with privacy access reports
and 2 apps with privacy leak reports.
3.3.3 Discussion
Advantages and Trade-Offs of MAMBA
The testing time and coverage results demonstrate that MAMBA has a significant
advantage in a lower testing time requirement per app (latency) for testing of ac-
tivities. Across all 500 apps, MAMBA was almost 4 times faster (13.18 mins/app
compared to 51.86 mins/app) in detecting and verifying privacy-related activities.
For the 230 apps with privacy behaviours, MAMBA was 2.7 times faster (57.11
mins/app compared to 21.52 mins/app). And for the 270 apps with no privacy be-
haviours, MAMBA had the largest advantage in being almost 8 times faster (47.4
mins/app compared to 6.08 mins/app). These testing time advantages are weighted
against a marginal 6.4% decrease in coverage by MAMBA compared to AMC
(63.95% to 70.33%). MAMBA is thus a very time efficient system for detection
of activities that have privacy implications compared to the AMC automated testing
method.
While the test cases were generated from a server, the automated testing times
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could be achieved by a laptop CPU. This demonstrates that MAMBA has good
scalability.
MAMBA’s static analysis component had a high precision of 79.84% and recall
of 68.9% in outputting correct privacy accesses, but had only a moderate precision
of 35.66% and recall of 56.10% in outputting privacy leaks. The lower accuracy of
privacy leak detection is to be expected however, as MAMBA does not analyze any
source-sink networked API calls. These accuracy results indicate that MAMBA’s
static analysis outputs (especially privacy accesses) might be directly applied to the
the Interactive Privacy Notifications App of Section 2.3, to save on automated app
testing time. There is, of course, a trade-off by a roughly 20% decrease in accuracy.
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Chapter 4
Understanding Utility of
User-Triggered Privacy Leak
Messages
In this section, I investigate and validate the utility of presenting information on
user-triggered privacy leaks uncovered in Chapter 2 to users. This is performed
using lab and field studies, and utilizes the Privacy Notification Mechanism detailed
in Section 2.3.
I chose to utilize a ’Non-Blocking’ mechanism of privacy notifications, in
which messages appear to users in the the background during various points of app
usage [54]. Such messages indicate to users the privacy cost or implications of app
usage or on performing certain in-app actions, but without providing users direct
control over allowing or blocking the data usage. This is in contrast to ’Blocking’
mechanisms, in which messages are accompanied with a GUI ’freeze’, where the
user is required to make a selection on the data access before app functionality can
be restored.
Why did I choose to validate using a ’Non-Enforcing’ mechanism?: While Enforc-
ing mechanisms have been utilized and studied in various privacy systems and
65
user-studies contexts [57, 14, 3, 5, 27] and have been shown to be effective, the
Non-Enforcing mechanism has been less studied for mobile app privacy. The Non-
Enforcing mechanism also fits my proposed framework better, due to the character-
istic of more fine-grained notifications having to be passed to the user during app
usage (e.g. Widget overlays and appearance of notifications on certain app layouts
etc.).
4.1 Small-Scale Lab-Study
4.1.1 Conduct of Lab-Study
I conducted a pre-deployment study of the privacy notifications app in the lab with
a small set of 12 users. The goal of the lab study was to observe if privacy messages
were effective for users in leak avoidance. The users consisted of students and staff
(8 males, 4 females) from the School of Information Systems in Singapore Man-
agement University. The users had an average age of 29 with 66% of participants
being expert Smartphone users.
The users were divided into 2 separate groups of 6 users each: a (i) Test Group
(with notifications) and (ii) Control Group (without notifications). Each user was
not informed which group they belonged to. Instructions were provided to users
that they might be observing display messages during application usage, and that
they were to utilize applications in as natural a manner as possible as if in a personal
capacity. No further context information was provided to them. The notification
app logged all widget click and page transition data of the users, and performed a
comparison between the two group. At the end of the study, participants were asked
to rate their ease of application usage on a Likert Scale, to measure differences in
usability between the 2 groups.
A screen capture of the Notification App as well as an example of a privacy
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(a)  Notification App (b) Toast Messages
Figure 4.1: (a) Notification App displaying leaky widgets and characteristics ob-
tained from the leak-cause database. (b) Privacy Message displaying the leak of
GPS Location on a clickable view (Flashes and disappears after a 3 second period)
Application Description Leak Type Cause
Sony TrackID Music Recognition App IMEI Button on start page
Telemaque Horoscope Lifestyle Horoscope App GPS & IMEI 4 widgets at different places
Linpus Weather Weather App GPS Button on main page
Super Backup: SMS & Contacts Tools Backup App Address Book & IMEI 4 widgets at different places
Table 4.1: List of applications used in lab-study
message is in Figure 4.1. I selected 4 apps for the study. The app names as well
as their leak-types and characteristics and causes are illustrated in Table 4.1 These
apps were chosen on the basis that they were relatively obscure apps in which users
would likely be unfamiliar with their layouts.
The user study was divide into two experiments, each involving 2 applications:
1. Experiment 1 (No instructions provided): We informed the participants that
they would be taking part in a privacy study, but did not tell them about the
existence of messages or provided further instructions. The participants were
then asked to use the applications for as long as they required, until they are
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satisfied that they have utilized or accessed every part of the application.
2. Experiment 2 (More detailed instructions): We informed the participants
about the existence of possible notifications, and they should try to make their
own decisions as to how they should utilize the application. The users were
also then asked to use the applications for as long as they required.
I utilized the Sony TrackID and Linpus Weather apps for Experiment 1, and
Telemaque Horoscope and Super Backup SMS apps for Experiment 2.
4.1.2 Results of Small-Scale Lab Study
Results of Experiment 1:
Figure 4.2: Percentage of Leaky Widgets Clicked on by Users in Experiment 1 (No
Instructions Provided) for ’Sony TrackID’ and ’Linpus Weather’ Apps
(Pls refer to Figure 4.2) For the ’Sony TrackID’ app, 100% of leaky widgets
were clicked on by users in the control group, compared to 60% in the test group.
This represented a 40% drop in the number of leaky widgets clicked on by partic-
ipants when presented with the notification. This was an encouraging result as it
68
shows that the behaviour of the user changes when presented with the notification
mechanism.
For the ’Linpus Weather’ application, there were no changes observed in be-
haviours among both test and control groups as participants from both groups
clicked on 40% of the leaky widgets. From our observation of the kind of leak that
the application was causing (GPS Location), it might be because participants did
not mind sharing their GPS location for this particular app. However, other reasons
such as users’ unfamiliarity and lack of knowledge that there would be notifications
might have played a part as well.
Results of Experiment 2:
Figure 4.3: Percentage of Leaky Widgets Clicked on by Users in Experiment 2
(More Detailed Instructions) for ’Telemaque Horoscope’ and ’Super Backup: SMS’
Apps
(Pls refer to Figure 4.3) For the ’Telemaque Horoscope’ app, 10% of leaky wid-
gets were clicked on by users in test group, compared to 50% in the control group.
Whereas for the ’Super Backup: SMS’ app, 50% of leaky widgets were clicked on
by users in the test group, compared to 70% in the control group. There were there-
fore decreases of 80% and 28.6% of number of leaky widgets clicked upon for the
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Telemaque Horoscope and Super Backup SMS apps respectively. These results are
promising as it shows that users’ privacy behaviours are positively affected, by them
clicking on fewer leaky widgets, when presented with the leak information and the
basic knowledge of what leak notifications are.
Based on user comments collected, 3 of the participants using the Telemarque
Horoscope application expressed discomfort with the data that the application was
utilizing and sending over the network (IMEI & GPS Location). 2 of the partici-
pants using the Super Backup SMS application expressed some discomfort with the
application send Address Book and IMEI data. But another 2 of the participants did
also mentioned that they could understand why the Super Backup SMS application
required the use of their Address Book, and felt that this was ok. Overall, the results
made sense as the general drop in the number of leaky widgets clicked by the users
in Experiment 2 was corresponding to the increased concerns that they had with
regards to the types of data the applications were sending. Furthermore, their com-
ments also indicated that there was good awareness of how the applications were
using and sending data, based on the appearance of the temporary messages besides
leaking widgets.
Usability Results:
Both test and user groups were asked to rate the usability of the applications on a 7
point Likert (7-Highly Usable to 1-Not Usable at All). The differences in the Likert
Scores between both Test and Control groups were not statistically significant, and
it was observed that 70% (with notification) and 80% (without notification) of users
gave a rating of 5 and above (10% decrease overall).
The results show that our mechanism does not greatly affect usability while still
notifying users of privacy leaks.
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Discussion
The user study demonstrates that under lab settings, the privacy messages are suc-
cessful in decreasing user leaks cause by clicking on leaky-causing widgets/buttons
during app usage. There were promising results with a 0% to 80% drop in users
avoiding the leaky widgets, while still maintaining usability with statistically in-
significant difference in usability ratings between the test and control groups. Fur-
thermore, feedback obtained from the users demonstrated increased user perception
and understanding of application data usage.
4.2 Large-Scale Field-Study
Next, I validated my notification mechanism on a larger number of users over a
longer time period of 2 weeks. Users on non-rooted devices were targeted, and the
study was designed to take place on their own personal mobile phones. The Field
Study was performed using a ’between-participants’ design, whereby 2 different
groups of users were randomly selected to be subjected to Test (With Notifications)
and Control (Without Notifications) conditions.
4.2.1 Conduct of Field-Study
Approach of the study:
The study was conducted from Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) and Singapore
Management University (SMU) campuses, after clearing the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) requirements of each institute. The study consisted of 3 phases. In
the 1st phase, we conducted pre-study surveys and briefings, as well as installed
our customized Notifications Application on the personal Android smartphones of
each user. In the 2nd phase, the users utilized their smartphones and applications in
their own capacity for a period of 2 weeks. The 3rd phase was conducted after the
2-week study, whereby the users were requested to complete a post-study survey.
71
Application App Type Privacy Leaks Displayed Message Locations Within App
Facebook Social-Media (Address-Book, Camera, (On Start-up; Beside 3 widgets)
IMEI, Location)
Instagram Social-Media GPS On Start-up
ChannelNewsAsia News Microphone On advert tab
The Straits Times News IMEI (On Start-up; Beside news items)
GMAIL Utility (Address-Book, Calendar (On Start-up; Beside 2 widgets)
, IMEI, Media Files)
UC Web-Browser Utility GPS & IMEI (On Start-up; Beside 1 widget)
YouDao Dictionary Utility (Camera, IMEI, (On Start-up; Beside 2 widgets)
Microphone)
Temple Run 2 Game GPS On Start-up
Subway Surfers Game IMEI On Start-up
Trivial Crack Game Address-Book (On Start-up; Beside 4 widgets)
Table 4.2: List of Applications used in Field-Study
User characteristics and perceptions were measured from the pre and post-study
surveys.
Characteristics of Notifications and Test Apps:
The Interactive Notifications App (described in Section 2.3) was utilized in the field
study to display privacy messages to users interactively during application operation
on their personal phones, using Android toast messages. (Refer to Table. 4.2 for the
apps and placement of notifications) As the work does not study or compare the im-
pact of phrasing or words used in the privacy messages, the messages were designed
to be non-alarming and concise. The messages contained sentences such as ’This
app accesses’ or ’Clicking this button accesses’, followed by the data type. To en-
sure that users did not miss reading messages, they appeared for a 5-second period.
Example of data types indicated included GPS Lication, Phone Identifier(IMEI),
Phone Book and Media Files etc. (Figure. 4.4 shows the screencaptures)
10 test applications were utilized in the study (Table. 4.2), and were selected
on the basis that they were already in regular usage by most of the test subjects.
The Notifications Applications also sends back usage statistics to a data collection
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Figure 4.4: (Messages Circled) Left: Privacy Message warning of phone book and
GPS Location Access ; Right: Privacy message appearing over a button warning of
access of phone identifiers on clicking the button. Bottom: A Blow-Up of a Privacy
Message
server for storage and processing. As shown in Table 4.2, the apps were chosen
to be representative of important app categories: Social-Media, News, Utility and
Game Apps. The privacy messages appeared on app start-ups as well as on-top of
various widgets and views when users arrived at them during usage.
Participants
The field study had 47 users (37 from CMU and 10 from SMU). They were ran-
domly divided into separate groups of Test (With Messages), and Control (Without
Messages). (25 Users in Test, 22 Users in Control) They consisted of staff/students
as well as external working adults. 37 of the participants were from CMU, while
10 of the participants were from SMU. Test subjects were recruited via posters
displayed on campus grounds, as well as from online adverts from Craigslist Pitts-
burgh. The subjects were made up of staff/students, as well as external working
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adults from the ages of 19 to 42 years of age (33 males and 14 females). Each sub-
ject from CMU was compensated USD30.00, while each subject from SMU was
compensated SGD30.00 for their participation in the 2-week study. Participants
were required to be at least 18 years of age and own an Android smartphone with
an OS of Android v4.1 and above.
Capture of User-Characteristics as Independent Variables
Characteristics of users were captured from pre and post-study surveys on 7-point
Likert-Scale as well as Yes/No questions. (Please refer to Appendix A, Figures
A.1 & A.2 for the Survey Forms) These characteristics include users’ Prior app
Usage-time (Familiarity), Surprise level, Usability, Privacy Consciousness level
and Disapproval of app data-usage. In addition to privacy messages, a subset of
17 users (10 males, 7 females) were randomly selected and provided with a stim-
ulus of additional User Education on the meaning of messages (e.g. IMEI were
identifiers that could allow tracking etc.) as well as implications of allowing ac-
cesses (private data could be sent over the network and stored by developers). This
allows the inclusion of the effects of users being provided additional User Education
in a regression model.
Figure 4.5: Questions in Post-Study Survey Form posed to each user asking them
how surprised they were with the privacy leakages of each application, as well as to
rate the appropriateness of the data access on a 7-Point Likert Scale
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As can be seen from the form in Figure. 4.5, the appropriateness rating of each
data type per application was phrased as the question: Please rate how appropri-
ate usage of ”Data Type” is: The rating was based on a 7-point Likert, with the
maximum score of 7(”Completely Appropriate”) and a minimum score of 1(”Not
Appropriate at All”). We also gauged the surprise levels to the data leaks by the
question: How surprised are you that this application leaks ”Data Type?” This
was again on a Likert scale, with 7(”Very surprised”) and 1(”Not surprised at all.”).
They were also asked the question: ”Knowing the data leak characteristics of the
app, will you still continue to use it?” (Yes/No/Unsure)
Using the post-study survey form, we were able to measure users’ level of ap-
proval/disapproval for each data-type leak for all of the test applications. A user was
deemed to be ’OK’ with the application’s data leak behaviour if he/she answered
’Yes’ to continuing to use the application on knowing its leak characteristics. Oth-
erwise, the user was deemed to be ’Not-OK’ with the application’s leak behaviour.
If the user replied ’Unsure’, he/she would be deemed ’OK’ if an average rating score
of 3 and above for the Data-type appropriateness was provided. (Note: The survey
question was directed towards the apps’ usage privacy data and not towards individ-
ual privacy messages) We posted the same form for the users in both the Treatment
and Control groups at the end of 2-weeks. We use these survey findings of user
variability to analyze the experimental study results in the next section.
Multiple Linear Regression
I conducted a multivariate regression with characteristics as Independent variables,
and 3 variables of (i) Frequency of App Start-Ups (Log), (ii) Duration of App Us-
age (Log) and (iii) No. of Leak Buttons Clicked (Log) as Dependent variables. We
investigated these Dependent variables as they were proportional to the amount of
privacy data being leaked by the application. The Independent Variables, their de-
scriptions as well as the questions posed in the surveys to capture them are displayed
in Table 4.3.
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No. Independent Variable Description Range
1 Privacy Messages Did user receive privacy messages? (Yes=1; No=0)
2 Disapproval of Data Usage Does user disapprove of the data accessed for a particular app? -(From post-study survey) (Yes=1; No=0)
3 User Education Did user receive additional briefing session on data-type meanings and privacy implications? (Yes=1; No=0)
4 App Type Category of particular app Categorical (1.Social Media, 2.News,
3.Utility, 4.Games)
5 Privacy Consciousness Question to user: ”How privacy-conscious would you describe yourself to be Likert Scale (7:”Extremely Consciousness” -
when using mobile apps?” -(From pre-study survey) 1:”Not Consciousness at all”)
6 Usability of App Question to user: ”Please rate how usable (convenient to use) the application is.” Likert Scale (7:”Very Usable” -
-(From post-study survey) 1:”Very Unusable”)
7 Surprise at Question to user: ”How surprised are you that this application leaks your ”data-type”?” Likert Scale (7:”Very Surprised” -
Message Content -(From post-study survey) 1:”Not Surprised at all”)
8 Prior App Usage Time Question to user: ”How long have you been using this app prior to this user-study?”” Values (3:Years, 2:Months,
(Familiarity) -(From post-study survey) 1:Weeks, 0:Not used prior to study)
Table 4.3: Description of Independent Variables in Multiple Regression
Each of the 3 Dependent variables (Freq. of Start-Ups, Duration of App Usage
(s) and No. of Leak Buttons Clicked) were analyzed separately in a log-linear
regression model. The model consists of the logarithmic form of each of these 3
metrics as dependent variables, with the independent variables of Table. 4.3. We
also included 2 and 3-factor interactions of Presence of Privacy Messages and
Disapproval of Data Usage with the other independent variables. The regression
model utilized is as follows:
Regression Model:
log(Frequency of Start Ups/Duration of App Usage/No. of Leak Buttons Clicked) =
Is Notification Present + App OK Not OK + Is Context Present +
factor(AppType) + Privacy Consciousness + Usability +
Familiarity + Surprise Level + Usability : Privacy Consciousness +
Is Notification Present : App OK Not OK + Is Notification Present :
Is ContextP resent + Is Notification Present : factor(AppType) +
Is Notification Present : Privacy Consciousness +
Is Notification Present : Usability + Is Notification Present :
Familiarity + Is Notification Present : Surprise Level +
App OK Not OK : Is Notification Present : Is Context Present +
App OK Not OK : Is Notification Present : factor(AppType) +
App OK Not OK : Is Notification Present : Privacy Consciousness +
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App OK Not OK : Is Notification Present : Usability +
App OK Not OK : Is Notification Present : Familiarity +
App OK Not OK : Is Notification Present : Surprise Level
4.2.2 Results of Field-Study
The results of the multivariate regressions are in Table. 4.4. The p-values of the
individual independent variables are displayed in the last column. We look out for
variables at 99%, 95% and 90% intervals (p-value≤0.001, 0.05 & 0.1), and negative
estimates that indicate the effectiveness of privacy messages by usage decreases.
The explanatory values of R2 were moderate from 0.294 to 0.442.
From Table. 4.4, of the individual main effects (List items 1-8), and for the
mobile usage metrics of (i) Frequency and (ii) Duration of App Usage, 2 factors of
’Application Type’ as well as ’Prior App Usage Time (Familiarity)’ were found to
be significant. For example in the 1st row of Table. 4.4, line 8, users who had used
the application previously for a longer period of time (Familiarity) had a significant
higher frequency of app start-ups (Estimate=0.15, p-value=1.83×10−7). For the
metric of of (iii) No. of Leak Widgets Clicked, ’App Type’ and ’User Education’
had significant effects.
I found significant 3-factor interaction effects of ’Privacy Messages’ and the
’Disapproval of Data Usage’ to: ’User Education’, ’Privacy Consciousness’, ’App
Type (Games)’ and ’Surprise at Message Content’. For example in the 2nd row of
Table. 4.4, line 9, users who received privacy messages and disapproved of the data
usages had a decrease in the Duration of App Usage, if he/she had the additional
stimulus of user education (Estimate=-1.23, p-value=1.38×10−4).
Effectiveness of Privacy Messages Mechanism
While the results indicate that the effects of Privacy Messages did not significantly
alter user behaviour across all users, the study highlights that a ’Non-Blocking’
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Depend. Independent Variable Estimate Std. Error p-value
Variable
(i) Freq.
of App
Start-Ups
(Log)
1. Privacy Messages
2. Disapproval of Data Use
3. User Education
4a. (Social Media)
4b. (News)**
4c. (Utility)***
4d. (Games)***
5. Privacy Consciousness
6. Usability of App
7. Surprise at Message Cont.
8. Prior App Usage Time
(Familiarity)***
9. Interactions (1 : 2 : 3)***
10. Interactions (1 : 2 : 5)*
(Adjusted R2 = 0.442)
-0.20
-0.08
0.07
Baseline
-0.39
-0.30
-0.52
1.32×10−3
-0.02
0.01
0.15
-0.46
-0.12
0.43
0.09
0.09
Baseline
0.18
0.11
0.11
0.06
0.05
0.02
0.03
0.16
0.06
0.63
0.37
0.45
Baseline
0.03
0.005
-9.87×10−6
0.98
0.74
0.62
1.83×10−7
0.005
0.06
(ii) Dur.
(sec) of
App
Usage
(Log)
1. Privacy Messages
2. Disapproval of Data Use
3. User Education
4a. (Social Media)
4b. (News)
4c. (Utility)**
4d. (Games)**
5. Privacy Consciousness
6. Usability of App
7. Surprise at Message Cont.
8. Prior App Usage Time
(Familiarity)***
9. Interactions (1 : 2 : 3)***
10. Interactions (1 : 2 : 5)**
11. Interactions (1 : 2 : 7)*
(Adjusted R2 = 0.316)
-0.13
-0.01
0.02
Baseline
0.11
-0.50
-0.45
0.12
0.06
0.04
0.24
-1.23
-0.28
-0.15
0.83
0.18
0.17
Baseline
0.35
0.20
0.22
0.12
0.10
0.04
0.05
0.32
0.12
0.08
0.88
0.95
0.90
Baseline
0.76
0.016
0.04**
0.33
0.54
0.31
1.23×10−5
1.38×10−4
0.021
0.07
(iii) No.
of Leak
Buttons
Clicked
(Log)
1. Privacy Messages
2. Disapproval of Data Use
3. User Education*
4a. (Social Media)
4b. (News)
4c. (Utility)***
4d. (Games)***
5. Privacy Consciousness
6. Usability of App
7. Surprise at Message Cont.
8. Prior App Usage Time
(Familiarity)
9. Interactions (1 : 2 : 3)***
10. Interactions (1 : 2 : 4d)**
11. Interactions (1 : 2 : 7)*
(Adjusted R2 = 0.294)
0.04
-2.52
-0.83
Baseline
-0.43
-2.38
-2.51
-0.09
-0.13
-0.03
0.10
-3.83
-3.89
-0.44
1.73
1.61
0.47
Baseline
0.67
0.46
0.88
0.31
0.23
0.12
0.12
0.95
1.58
0.25
0.98
0.12
0.08
Baseline
0.52
5.34×10−7
4.66×10−3
0.76
0.58
0.78
0.40
7.86×10−5
0.01
0.08
Table 4.4: Results: Multiple Linear Regression of Field Study (***99%, **95%,
*90% Confidence Intervals)
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mechanism can be still be effective under certain conditions. The significant
3-factor interaction effects uncovered that user-disapproval with accesses, user-
education, inherent levels of privacy consciousness as well as high surprise-levels
are required for the effectiveness of a ’Non-Blocking’ mechanism. Although a com-
parison study on non-blocking and blocking mechanisms is beyond the scope of this
thesis, I see that, for stronger overall effects, especially for users who have a longer
history of usage of the particular app as well as for warning of more serious issues
such as malware, ’Blocking’ mechanisms would be advocated.
4.2.3 Discussion & Factors Influencing Usage Behaviours
Users utilized Social Media apps significantly more than the other app categories.
The Prior App Usage Time (Familiarity) had the highest statistical strength in influ-
encing app usage behaviours of App Start-up Frequency and App Usage Durations
across all users. This implies that users who have been utilizing the applications for
a longer period of time were less likely to decrease utilization of the applications,
in spite of receiving the Privacy Messages.
This has both positive and negative implications. A positive implication is that
implementing privacy messages on applications is unlikely to cause its overall rate
and duration of usages to drop. And this supports the notion that mobile platforms
or developers can readily deploy privacy messages to users without badly decreas-
ing overall usage rates. A negative implication is that privacy messages might not
function well in scenarios where strong overall effects on users are desirable (e.g.
Warning of security issues).
As mentioned earlier, all significant interactions found included both Privacy
Messages together with the Disapproval of Data Use. The user’s disapproval of
data use by an app was thus critical in determining the effectiveness of privacy
messages. We did not find any significant 3-factor interactions involving Prior App
Usage Time (Familiarity),(i.e.Interactions(1:2:8)). This indicates that users who
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received privacy messages and disapproved were unaffected by App Familiarity.
From in Table. 4.4, the strongest interaction for all 3 usage metrics was between
(Privacy Messages: Disapproval of Data Usage: User Education). Users who re-
ceived privacy messages, disapproved of data usage indicated and had additional
user education had decreased app usage metrics. User Education was thus a strong
factor allowing for the effectiveness of the privacy messages. The implications are
that it is important for app stores and developers to ensure that users have a proper
understanding of the meanings as well as consequences of privacy related messages
to optimize its effectiveness. It would be greatly beneficial for platforms to include
educational aspects in the privacy messaging framework. A possible idea might be
the implementation of voice messages or sliding screens detailing privacy implica-
tions and explanations of data meanings, which might improve the effectiveness of
privacy messages. There exists opportunities for future exploration in this area.
Another significant interaction found was that between (Privacy Messages: Dis-
approval of Data Usage: Privacy Consciousness) for Frequency of Start-ups, as
well as for Duration of App Usage. Users who received privacy messages and dis-
approved of the data usages had decreased app usage metrics if they had a higher
level of Privacy Consciousness. This was an indication that users who disapproved
of the privacy message contents were reacting accordingly to their privacy comfort
levels.
A third significant interaction was between (Privacy Messages: Disapproval of
Data Usage: Surprise at Message Content) for Duration of App Usages and Num-
ber of Widgets clicked. Users who were more surprised at the messages, and dis-
approved of the data usages, were thus more likely to have decreased app usage
metrics. Users were more likely to react properly to messages in which there were
strong contrasts between legitimate and questionable usage, which increased sur-
prise. This suggests that it might be beneficial for platforms to utilize message
designs that increase this contrasts, so that users have a higher level of surprise
towards the privacy accesses indicated.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation, my main motivation is the investigation into the novel and
unique context of causes of user-triggered privacy app behaviours as well as the
activity transition paths towards these behaviours. I presented the design, imple-
mentation and evaluation of my solution (MAMBA) for achieving this goal. The
solution involves a hybrid application of static analysis and automated runtime test-
ing of app binaries. And the techniques utilized are control-flow analysis as well as
dataflow analysis for callback functions.
My MAMBA solution achieved a much higher success rate (Over 70% com-
pared to 13%) in the analysis of callback functions than previous recent work
(GATOR [63]), for the purposes of generating an activity transition graph (ATG)
that guides automated runtime testing of Android apps. The solution also demon-
strated large time savings compared to another automated testing system, the Au-
tomated Model Checker (AMC), with only a small trade-off in activity coverage.
MAMBA’s static analysis also had high accuracy in outputting activities with pri-
vacy access behaviours (79.84%), and had a moderate accuracy in outputting activ-
ities with privacy leak behaviours (35.66%).
User studies demonstrated that presentation of the additional context can help
users to improve their app usage behaviours. Improvements in app usage behaviours
were measured by the decrease in app start up frequencies, usage durations as well
81
as clicking on fewer privacy culprit buttons/widgets, for the apps with privacy us-
ages which users disapproved of. It was also found that for the ’Non-Blocking’
delivery mechanism, the users’ prior app usage history was the strongest determin-
ing factor influencing privacy behaviours. And there were certain conditions which
enhanced the effectiveness of the ’Non-Blocking’ mechanism - Namely users’ dis-
approval of privacy messages, sufficient understanding on the meaning and impli-
cation of notices, being inherently privacy conscious as well as surprise towards the
app’s privacy behaviours in the notices.
I describe some possible extensions for future work in the next section.
5.1 Future Work
5.1.1 Extensions to MAMBA System
Static Analysis of App Privacy Leaks
An extension to MAMBA’s static analysis to output target activities with privacy
leak behaviours would be very useful. At the moment, MAMBA does not analyze
the control flow of network function calls (e.g. HTTP and POST), and is thus unable
to differentiate between privacy access and privacy leak behaviours.
This extension could be performed by utilizing FlowDroid’s [9] static taint
tracking to analyze network calls as ’sink’ points, to observe if sensitive data vari-
ables are linked to network function calls. This would likely increase the precision
of MAMBA’s privacy leak detection from its current 35.7%, and allow the direct
use of static analysis outputs for user notifications without the need for runtime
verification with TaintDroid.
A performance concern however, would be an increase in the time required
for completion of static analysis. While FlowDroid’s taint tracking is known
to have reasonable overheads [9], an evaluation would be required for accurate
determination.
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Improved Analysis of Android Callback Functions
At the moment, while MAMBA has a high success rate for analysis of Android Call-
back Functions, it suffers from generalizability issues. This reduces the capability
to output fully directed test cases, which it overcomes by producing semi directed
test cases. These issues stem from MAMBA missing out on possible variants in the
implementation of listener invocations within the Android framework, and the prob-
lem is compounded by differences in Android API versions as well as the utilization
of custom view libraries by developers. In-depth modelling of listener invocations
could be thus performed to enhance MAMBA’s capability of analyzing callback
functions.
Improved Runtime Privacy Detection
MAMBA current instruments 2 privacy detectors, PMP and TaintDroid. While these
privacy detectors are well regarded and extensively utilized by the research commu-
nity, they have reported vulnerabilities that malicious apps can potentially exploit
and bypass [11]. Future work could be aimed towards patching up some of these
vulnerabilities of privacy detectors for improved privacy detection. The solution
would require the proposal of defences against some of the reported attacks in ex-
isting literature (e.g. ’System-File Attack’ or ’File Length Attack’ etc.).
Another possibility to improve runtime privacy detection is the tracking of ker-
nel related system calls which are linked to users’ data privacy. A survey would
be required to document which system calls are related to the privacy data as well
as network and other calls that could indicate potential privacy leaks on Android.
Such a survey might be done manually or by using automated tools (e.g. SUSI [49]).
While the tracking of kernel system calls would certainly result in an improvement
in the accuracy of runtime privacy detection, a concern is that large overheads on
the phone would be incurred. However, as MAMBA is based on back end analysis,
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these overheads would not be relevant as they would be incurred on test devices
instead of on user devices.
Extended Comparisons of Automated Testers
From Appendix A, I detailed 4 types of automated testing solutions, based on a
survey of existing research. These are: (i) Random, (ii) Systematic Event Selec-
tion, (iii) Model-Based (Built at runtime) and (iv) Model-Based (Built from static
analysis). A comparison could be made by the re-implementation of representative
systems from each of these groups (e.g. Monkey [18], VanarSena [51], PUMA [31]
and A3E [10]), and evaluating them with the MAMBA automated tester on a scaled
up number of a few thousand apps. A significant contribution can be claimed if
MAMBA can demonstrate improvements in terms of lower testing time, higher cov-
erage as well as the reachability of certain runtime app states that other automated
testers might be unable to reach.
5.1.2 Privacy User Studies
Improvement & Extension of Field Study
The field study conducted in Chapter 4.2 can be improved by changing the study
from a ’Between-participants’ to a ’Within-participants’ design, extending the num-
ber of test apps, controlling users’ prior knowledge on the test apps as well as by
improving the user survey mechanism.
The current field study was conducted with a ’Between-participants’ design,
in which the test stimulus was conducted over 2 different groups of users. While
this was acceptable, it requires a large number of users to be statistically confi-
dent. While 47 users cannot be considered a small number for a HCI study, a larger
number of users would increase the validity of the findings. Instead of conducting
the study over more users, it would however be advantageous to change the study
design to a ’Within-participants’ design, whereby the comparisons would be made
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based on test and control stimulus presented to the same user.
While the current study’s 10 test apps were solicited from a pre-study survey,
the current app list might be too small to optimally represent the apps that all users
were already regularly using. There were users who were regularly using only a
small number of apps from the list prior to the study. An improvement can be made
by observation of users’ app usage histories (this can be done during the control
phase of a ’Within-participants’ design), and extending the list of test apps based on
these user histories.
Another improvement can be made by controlling users’ prior knowledge on
the test apps in which privacy messages would appear on. In the current field study,
users were aware of the test apps that were being utilized in the study, as they were
required to install any apps that they did not already have from the list of 10 test
apps. This could have introduced biases in the study, as users could be utilizing the
test apps more with the mistaken idea that this would help the study. Users should
thus be withheld any information with regard to the names of the test apps in future
studies.
Finally, the survey mechanism can be improved in future studies. In the current
field study, users were surveyed only twice - Pre study and Post study. The users
can be surveyed more frequently at regular intervals during the duration of the study
(e.g. Survey at every 3-day interval). A customized survey mechanism would have
to be developed that can send prompts at regular intervals to users, as well as gen-
erate survey forms for users based on their app usage during in between the survey
time intervals. More fine grained surveys will mean that more fine grained user
characteristics can be obtained (e.g. User approval at the data level for each app, or
at the message level granularity).
In addition, usage of a customized survey mechanism can allow extension of the
field study to investigate if the privacy notices can allow users to set better privacy
policies in data access control of their apps. These might be posed in the form of
survey questions, such as whether they would prefer to allow or deny access of the
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data utilization behaviour of their test apps. This can be used to demonstrate that
providing the additional context of causes of user-triggered privacy leaks can allow
users to set better privacy policies, so that apps’ privacy behaviours follow closer to
their provided functionalities.
Study on Privacy Notification Mechanisms
In Appendix A, a comparisons table for Privacy Notification Systems is provided.
The table details the notification mechanisms utilized for the privacy systems sur-
veyed. Future work might be performed to compare between the dimensions of
’Notification Content’ and ’Notification Interface’ of these other privacy systems
with that of MAMBA’s privacy notification mechanism. In addition, the different
factors of ’Frequency’, ’Timing’ as well as ’Granularity’ might be investigated for
their efficacy in the effectiveness of the notification mechanisms.
The ’Notification Content’ of my MAMBA system can be compared together
with 2 existing types: (i) Notices on real time privacy data accesses and (ii) Summa-
rized privacy access control lists can be evaluated together. Ideally, the evaluation
should be performed in field studies. But for ease of conduct can also be performed
on mechanical turk platforms, where users could be shown mock ups of these con-
tents or screen captures. Users would be surveyed on the privacy access policies
that they would set (Allow/Deny). The evaluation metrics could be - Functionality
profile of the app (App functionality requires/does not require privacy data type)
as well as the Correctness of privacy profile set by user (% of privacy data access
control decisions that fits app’s functionality profile).
The ’Notification Interface’ of my MAMBA system can also be compared with
a few types of: (i) Install Time List, (ii) Android Notifications (Standard scroll
down), (iii) Dialog Box and (iv) Summary List. This might be performed under a lab
setting, where users would be asked to complete tasks on the apps, and observing the
appearance of different types of notification interfaces. The evaluation metrics could
be - User feedback on usability and preference, Recall of users, Task completion
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time and Effectiveness of privacy leak avoidance.
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Appendix A
Appendix
List of Privacy Sensitive Data API Invocation Calls Utilized By MAMBA
• getLatitude
• getLongitude
• getLastKnownLocation
• requestLocationUpdates
• getLastLocation
• getConnectionInfo
• getMacAddress
• getDeviceId
• getSubscriberId
• getSimSerialNumber
• ContactsContract
• pictureFile
• getCameraInfo
• FEATURE CAMERA
• getLine1Number
• startRecording
• MediaRecorder
• mRecorder
• CallLog.Calls
• content://sms
• CalendarContract
• ClipboardManager
• Secure.ANDROID ID
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm For Sensitive API Association with App Activities
1: INPUT: Sensitive Data APIs
2: OUTPUT: Target App Activities Associated with APIs To Reach/Test
3:
4: JimpleSet← getJimpleBytecodeRepresentations()
5: sensitiveAPISet← getSensitiveAPISet()
6: activityClassSet← getActivityClasses()
7: activityMethodSet← getMethods()
8:
9: begin
10:
11: for each Activity ∈ activityClassSet do
12:
13: for each Method ∈ activityMethodSet do
14: Method Body β ∈ getActiveBody()
15: All Sensitive API Invocation Points α←
16: getAllSensitiveInvocationPoints()
17:
18: for each Invocation Point in α do
19: Get Methods along back-tracked CFG, backTrackMethodSet←
20: backTrackCFG(α)
21:
22: for each Method in backTrackMethodSet do
23: Activity Class containing Method µ← getClass(Method)
24: if Method is of ’onCreate’ lifecycle then
25: if µ ∈ activityMethodSet then
26: Target Activity to Reach τ1←
27: targetActivityToReachSet.add(µ)
28:
29: else if Method is of ’User-Input’ Handling Type then
30: if µ ∈ activityMethodSet then
31: Target Activity to Test τ2←
32: targetActivityToTestSet.add(µ)
33:
34: end
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm For Generating Fully-Directed Activity Transition Graph
(ATG)
1: INPUT: Application Binary
2: OUTPUT: Edges of Activity Transition Graph (ATG)
3:
4: JimpleSet← getJimpleBytecodeRepresentations()
5: CallbackSet← getCallbackClasses()
6: activityClassSet← getActivityClasses()
7:
8: begin
9:
10: for each Activity ∈ activityClassSet do
11:
12: for each Callback Method ∈ in Activity do
13:
14: if Method is of ’onCreate’ lifecycle then
15: if findStartActivityInvocation() is True then
16: ATG Edge ε← ATG.add(callback of previousActivity,
17: callback of nextActivity)
18:
19: Listener Invocation Point λ← getListenerInvocation()
20:
21: Get Statements Along Backwards Data Flow of Listener, Φ←
22: dataFlowTracking(λ,Method)
23:
24: for each Statement in Φ do
25: if Statement ∈ View ID Retrieval from XML Resources then
26: Get View ID, ID← getID(Statement)
27: Get Widget Identifier, I← getXMLResource(ID)
28:
29: if Statement Contains Object File of Listener then
30:
31: Get Active Body of User-driven Callback Function
32: of Object File, body←
33: getActivityBodyObjectListener(Object File)
34:
35: Get Next Activity from Bytecode body, nextActivity←
36: getNextActivity(body)
37:
38: Get User-driven Callback Function of Previous Activity,
39: callbackPreviousActivity← getCallBack(Activity)
40:
41: Get ’onCreate’ Callback Function of Next Activity,
42: callbackNextActivity← getCallBack(nextActivity)
43:
44: ATG Edge ε←ATG.add(callbackPreviousActivity,callbackNextActivity
45: , I)
46:
47: end 95
Algorithm 3 Algorithm For Generating Semi-Directed Activity Transition Graph
(ATG)
1: INPUT: Application Binary
2: OUTPUT: Edges of Activity Transition Graph (ATG)
3:
4: JimpleSet← getJimpleBytecodeRepresentations()
5: CallbackSet← getCallbackClasses()
6: activityClassSet← getActivityClasses()
7:
8: begin
9:
10: for each Activity ∈ activityClassSet do
11:
12: for each Callback Method ∈ in Activity do
13:
14: Listener Invocation Point λ← getListenerInvocation()
15:
16: if λ != Null then
17: Get All Statements in Method, µ← getAllStatements(Method)
18:
19: for each Statement in µ do
20: if Statement ∈ View ID Retrieval from XML Resources then
21: Get View ID, ID← getID(Statement)
22: Get Widget Identifier, I← getXMLResource(ID)
23:
24: Add to List of Possible Widget Identifiers,
25: possibleWidgetIDs.add(I)
26:
27: Get All Listener Object Files of Activity, τ
28: ← getAllListenerObjects(Activity)
29:
30: for each Object File O in τ do
31:
32: Get Active Body of User-Driven Callback Function of Object File, body
33: ← getActivityBodyObjectListener(Object File)
34:
35: if startActivity Intent in body then
36: Get Next Activity from Bytecode Body, nextActivity
37: ← getNextActivity(body)
38:
39: Add to List of Possible Activity Transitions, possibleActivity
40: Transitions.add(nextActivity)
41:
42: for each Activity, nextActivity, in possibleActivityTransitions do
43: for each Widget Identifier,I, in possibleWidgetIDs do
44:
45: ATG Edge ε←ATG.add(callbackPreviousActivity,callbackNextActivity
46: , I)
47:
48: end
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Table A.1: Comparison Table of Privacy Detection & Protection Systems
System
Privacy-Related
Behaviour
Analyzed
Usable Outputs Technique for AppCoverage Latency Coverage Accuracy
1.
AppIntent [65]
Data transmissions
and the UI states
during such
occurrences for an
analyst to make
determinations.
Sequence of app
screen captures of
app operation during
data transmissions.
Static taint
analysis/Dynamic
Analysis (Symbolic
Execution)
2 hours/app High Not reported.
2. AppsPlay-
Ground [50]
Malicious behaviour
in apps. (e.g. root
exploits, background
SMS sending etc.)
Flagging of apps as
having malicious
behaviour and data
leaks.
Dynamic Analysis
(Fuzz testing)
Medium to
low
33% code
coverage Not reported.
3. Ap-
poscopy [26] Privacy malware.
Flagging of apps
with
control/data-flow
signatures matching
known privacy
malware signatures.
Static analysis
(Malicious Signature
Matching)
5.8 mins/app High 90%
4. ANDRU-
BIS [41]
Malicious
behaviours
Analysis report on
malicious app
behaviour from an
online submission.
Static/Dynamic
Analysis (
Machine-Learning
Classification)
20 mins/app Notreported. >90%
5. DroidAna-
lyst [25]
Signature-based
malware detection.
Analysis report on
malicious behaviour.
Static/Dynamic
Analysis
(Machine-Learning
Classification)
>20 mins/app 50-80% 85%
6.
FlowDroid [9]
Taint analysis of
privacy data.
Program Sources &
Sinks of privacy
leaks.
Static analysis 2.5 mins/app High 93%
7. GORT [7] Privacy Behaviouralheuristics
Provides a GUI for
analysts to easily
digest privacy
behaviours of apps.
Static/Dynamic
Analysis > 60 mins/app
49.5%
activity
coverage
Not reported.
8.
MARVIN [40]
App privacy risk
level
Provides a privacy
risk assessment
score.
Static/Dynamic
Analysis
(Machine-Learning
Classification)
>20 mins/app Notreported. 98%
9. Profile-
Droid [59]
Network traffic of
app
Provides
origins/sources of
the network traffic.
Static/Dynamic
Analysis
>1 day/app
(Measure-
ments taken
multiple
times)
Nil Nil
10. PiOs [23] Taint analysis ofprivacy data.
Program Sources &
Sinks of privacy
leaks.
Static analysis Not reported. High Not reported.
11.
SUPOR [34]
Sensitive user inputs
(e.g. passwords,
credit card nos. etc.)
Flag vulnerabilities
with sensitive user
inputs.
Static analysis 3.7 mins/app High 97.3%
12. ReCon [52]
Personally
identifiable
information (PIIs)
leaked from apps.
Information on leaks
of PIIs by apps.
Dynamic analysis
(Machine-Learning
from Network
Flows)
Few mins/app Notreported. 98.1%
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Table A.2: Comparison Table for Automated Testing Systems
System ExplorationStrategy
Exploration
Target
Exploration
Technique
Inputs
Simulated Purpose
1. Intent-
Fuzzer [62]
(i) Random All Pages
Dynamic
Analysis
UI Events Stress Testing
2.
Monkey [18]
(i) Random All Pages ” UI Events General Testing
3. Dyn-
odroid [43]
(ii) Systematic
Event
Selection
All Pages ”
UI Events/
System Inputs
Crash Testing
4. Va-
narSena [51]
(ii) Systematic
Event
Selection
All Pages ” UI Events Crash Testing
5. AppsPlay-
ground [50]
(ii) Systematic
Event
Selection
All Pages ” UI Events Privacy/ Fuzz Testing
6. ACTEve [8]
(ii) Systematic
Event
Selection
All Pages ”
UI Events/
System Inputs
Concolic Testing
7. PUMA [31]
(iii)
Model-Based
(On-the-Fly at
Runtime)
Flexible/
Customizable
” UI Events General Testing
8. AMC [39]
(iii)
Model-Based
(On-the-Fly at
Runtime)
Distinct Pages ” UI Events UI Checking
9. A3E(Depth-
First
Mode) [10]
(iii)
Model-Based
(On-the-Fly at
Runtime)
All Pages ” UI Events General Testing
10.
DECAF [42]
(iii)
Model-Based
(On-the-Fly at
Runtime)
Distinct Pages ” UI Events Ad layouts
11.
A3E(Targeted
Mode) [10]
(iv)
Model-Based
(Pre-Runtime
Analysis)
Distinct Pages
Dynamic &
Static
Analysis
UI Events General Testing
12.
ORBIT [64]
(iv)
Model-Based
(Pre-Runtime
Analysis)
All Pages ” UI Events General Testing
13. Brahmas-
tra [15]
(iv)
Model-Based
(Pre-Runtime
Analysis)
Distinct Pages ” UI Events Ad Checking
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Table A.3: Comparison Table for Privacy Notification Systems
System NotificationContent
Notification
Interface Frequency Action Timing Granularity
1. Aura-
sium [61]
Real-time privacy
data access; Network
IP details; Privilege
Escalation
Dialog Box
Every
access
instance;
Set Rule
Blocking
Before
event
Data level
2.
APEX [44]
Permission data
control at install
time.
Install-time
List;
Dialog Box
Every
install
instance;
Every
access
instance
Blocking
After
event
App/Data level
3. AppIn-
tent [65]
Sequence of screen
captures of app
operation with notice
appearing on privacy
data sending. (Meant
for analyst to check)
Android
Toast
Message
Every
access
instance
Non-
Blocking
After
event
Data level
4.
AppOps [6]
Real-time privacy
data access;
Summarized access
control of privacy
data
Privacy
Manager
List;
Dialog Box
First
access
instance;
Config-
urable
Blocking
Before
event
App/Data level
5. Protect-
MyPrivacy
(PMP) [48]
Real-time privacy
data access;
Summarized access
control of privacy
data
Privacy
Manager
List;
Android
Notifica-
tions
First
access
instance;
Config-
urable
Blocking
Before
event
App/Data level
6. LBE
Privacy
Guard [29]
Real-time privacy
data access;
Summarized access
control of privacy
data
Privacy
Manager
List;
Android
Notifica-
tions
First
access
instance;
Config-
urable
Blocking
Before
event
App/Data Level
7.
Permission
Tracker [38]
Provide 3 different
levels of details with
regards to data
permission: (i) App
categories, (ii)
Permission
categories, (iii)
Frequency of
permissions.
Privacy
Manager
List;
Dialog Box
Every
access
instance;
Config-
urable
Blocking
Before
event
Data level
99
System NotificationContent
Notification
Interface Frequency Action Timing Granularity
8. Mock-
Droid [14]
Real-time privacy
data access;
Summarized access
control of privacy
data
Privacy
Manager
List;
Android
Notifica-
tions
Every
access
instance;
Set Rule
Blocking
Before
event
Data level
9. Privacy
Nudging [5]
Informs user on
frequency of privacy
data accesses and
number of apps that
accessed the data
over a time period.
Privacy
Manager
List;
Android
Notifica-
tions
Periodic
(default:
once
daily)
Non-
Blocking
After
many
events
App/Data Level
10. Privacy
Mod [55]
Background notice
informs user that app
is using data.
Informs user on
frequency of privacy
data accesses.
Privacy
Manager
List;
Android
Toast
Message
Every
access
instance
Non-
Blocking
After
event
Data level
11.
ReCon [52]
Informs user on
frequency of
personally
identifiable
information (PII) and
number of apps that
accessed the data
over a time period.
Summarized
UI
-
Non-
Blocking
After
event
Data level
12. Taint-
Droid [24]
Real-time privacy
data access
Android
Notifica-
tions
Every leak
instance
Non-
Blocking
After
event
Data level
100
Figure A.1: Pre Study Survey Form
101
Figure A.2: Post Study Survey Form (Example: Facebook App)
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